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Thoughts, motor actions, and the self.Gottfried Vosgerau & Albert Newen - 2007 - Mind and Language 22 (1):22–43.details
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The explanatory need for mental representations in cognitive science.Barbara Von Eckardt - 2003 - Mind and Language 18 (4):427-439.details
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Extended mathematical cognition: external representations with non-derived content.Karina Vold & Dirk Schlimm - 2020 - Synthese 197 (9):3757-3777.details
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A theory of traits.Fred Vollmer - 1993 - Philosophical Psychology 6 (1):67 – 79.details
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Primate tool use: Parsimonious explanations make better science.Elisabetta Visalberghi - 1989 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 12 (3):608-609.details
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The Sense of Time.Gerardo Viera - 2020 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 71 (2):443-469.details
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Owning Intentions and Moral Responsibility.Tillmann Vierkant - 2005 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 8 (5):507-534.details
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The role of dispositions in explanations.Agustín Vicente - 2010 - Theoria: Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia 19 (3):301-310.details
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On the causal completeness of physics.Agustín Vicente - 2006 - International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 20 (2):149 – 171.details
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La teoría dretskeana de la causación mental ante la explicación psicológica.Agustín Vicente - 2000 - Endoxa 1 (13):9.details
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Functions and emergence: when functional properties have something to say.Agustín Vicente - 2011 - Philosophical Studies 152 (2):293-312.details
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Burge on Representation and Biological Function.Agustín Vicente - 2012 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 1 (2):125-133.details
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Common sense, functional theories and knowledge of the mind.Max Velmans - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):85-86.details
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Intentional system theory and experimental psychology.Michael H. Van Kleeck - 1988 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 11 (3):533.details
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Thinking by doing: Rylean regress and the metaphysics of action.Markos Valaris - 2020 - Synthese 197 (8):3395-3412.details
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The Problem of Simple Minds: Is There Anything It Is Like to Be a Honey Bee? [REVIEW]Michael Tye - 1997 - Philosophical Studies 88 (3):289-317.details
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Implicit and Explicit Goal-Directedness.Michael A. Trestman - 2012 - Erkenntnis 77 (2):207-236.details
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Where's the person?Michael Tomasello - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):84-85.details
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Cognition as cause.Michael Tomasello - 1989 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 12 (3):607-608.details
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Birdsong: Variations that follow rules.Dietmar Todt & Henrike Hultsch - 1992 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 15 (2):289-290.details
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The problem of simple minds: Is there anything it is like to be a honey bee?Michael Tye - 1997 - Philosophical Studies 88 (3):289-317.details
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Why Alison Gopnik should be a behaviorist.Nicholas S. Thompson - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):83-84.details
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Sensorimotor reference frames and physiological attractors.René Thom - 1992 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 15 (2):289-289.details
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Neural Representations Observed.Eric Thomson & Gualtiero Piccinini - 2018 - Minds and Machines 28 (1):191-235.details
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What really matters.Charles Taylor - 1988 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 11 (3):532.details
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Adopting Affective Science in Composition Studies: A Literature Review.Jordan C. V. Taylor - 2022 - Sage Publications: Emotion Review 14 (1):43-54.details
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Jaka teoria działania? O Mechanice działań Michała Barcza.Maciej Tarnowski - 2020 - Filozofia Nauki 28 (4):83-102.details
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Intentionality and partial belief.Weng Hong Tang - 2014 - Synthese 191 (7).details
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Appetitive besires and the fuss about fit.Steven Swartzer - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 165 (3):975-988.details
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Indeterminacy in recent theories of content.Donna M. Summerfield & Pat A. Manfredi - 1998 - Minds and Machines 8 (2):181-202.details
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Phenomenological Naturalism.David Suarez - 2017 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 25 (4):437-453.details
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The Semantic Shuffle: Shifting Emphasis in Dretske's Account of Representational Content.David Sturdee - 1997 - Erkenntnis 47 (1):89-103.details
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Mental causation and the paradoxes of explanation.Karsten R. Stueber - 2005 - Philosophical Studies 122 (3):243-77.details
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Why Jonas Olson Cannot Believe the Error Theory Either.Bart Streumer - 2016 - Journal of Moral Philosophy 13 (4):419-436.details
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What someone’s behaviour must be like if we are to be aware of their emotions in it.Rowland Stout - 2012 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 11 (2):135-148.details
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Aesthetics and cognitive science.Dustin Stokes - 2009 - Philosophy Compass 4 (5):715-733.details
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Intentionality and naturalism.Stephen P. Stich & Stephen Laurence - 1994 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1):159-82.details
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Connectionism, Realism, and realism.Stephen P. Stich - 1988 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 11 (3):531.details
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The Structures of Social Structural Explanation: Comments on Haslanger’s What is (Social) Structural Explanation?.Rachel Katharine Sterken - 2018 - Disputatio 10 (50):173-199.details
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Spinoza on Human Purposiveness and Mental Causation.Justin Steinberg - 2011 - Logical Analysis and History of Philosophy 14 (1):51-70.details
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Processes, Continuants, and Individuals.Helen Steward - 2013 - Mind 122 (487):fzt080.details
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Dna, inference, and information.Ulrich E. Stegmann - 2009 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 60 (1):1-17.details
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Categories, categorisation and development: Introspective knowledge is no threat to functionalism.Kim Sterelny - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):81-83.details
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Actions as processes.Helen Steward - 2012 - Philosophical Perspectives 26 (1):373-388.details
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The developmental history of an illusion.Keith E. Stanovich - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):80-81.details
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Continuities and Discontinuities Between Humans, Intelligent Machines, and Other Entities.Johnny Hartz Søraker - 2014 - Philosophy and Technology 27 (1):31-46.details
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Review of William M. Ramsey Representation Reconsidered.Mark Sprevak - 2011 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 62 (3):669-675.details
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Two Kinds of Information Processing in Cognition.Mark Sprevak - 2020 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 11 (3):591-611.details
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Anti-intellectualism, instructive representations, and the intentional action argument.Alison Ann Springle & Justin Humphreys - 2021 - Synthese (3):7919-7955.details
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