A blindspot is a consistent but inaccessible proposition. For instance, I cannot know 'The test is on Friday but I do not know it'. No contradiction follows from the supposition that you know my blindspot. But could you know my blindspot if we are epistemic peers? Epistemic peers have the same evidence and reasoning ability. So either both peers know a proposition or both are ignorant. Since I cannot know my blindspot, neither can my peer. Thus the formal ignorance associated (...) with blindspots spreads to my peers. This contagion is used to improve a solution to the blindspot solution to the surprise test paradox. (shrink)

In this paper I explore the role of manners and morals. In particular, what is the connection between emotional demeanor and the inner stuff of virtue? Does the fact that we can pose faces and hide our inner sentiments, i.e., 'fake it,' detract from or add to our capacity for virtue? I argue, following a line from the Stoics, that it can add to our virtue and that, as a result, moral education needs to take seriously both a commitment to (...) good character and a commitment to the 'aesthetic' of character. (shrink)

While there are companies whose codes of ethics state that mere appearance of unethical behavior by employees is morally unacceptable, this so‐called appearance standard has hardly received any attention in the business ethics literature. Using corporate integrity theory, this article explores the criteria that may explain how mere appearances of unethical behavior can arise (i.e., the presence of conflicts of interests, the entanglement of these interests, a reputation for lack of integrity, and deviant outcomes) and those that may make such (...) appearances morally unacceptable (i.e., foreseeability, avoidability, and seriousness). The article proposes remedies for preventing and resolving instances when mere appearance of unethical behavior is morally unacceptable. (shrink)