In this introductory article, we provide a historical and philosophical framework for studying crisis discussions in psychology. We first trace the various meanings of crisis talk outside and inside of the sciences. We then turn to Kuhn’s concept of crisis, which is mainly an analyst’s category referring to severe clashes between theory and data. His view has also dominated many discussions on the status of psychology: Can it be considered a “mature” science, or are we dealing here with a pre- (...) or multi-paradigmatic discipline? Against these Kuhnian perspectives, we point out that especially, but not only in psychology distinctive crisis declarations and debates have taken place since at least the late 19th century. In these, quite different usages of crisis talk have emerged, which can be determined by looking at (a) the content and (b) the dimensions of the declarations, as well as (c) the functions these declarations had for their authors. Thus, in psychology at least, ‘crisis’ has been a vigorous actor’s category, occasionally having actual effects on the future course of research. While such crisis declarations need not be taken at face value, they nevertheless help to break the spell of Kuhnian analyses of psychology’s history. They should inform ways in which the history and philosophy of psychology is studied further. (shrink)

En este texto se elabora un análisis historiográfico, filosófico y teórico en torno a diversas propuestas de caracterización, demarcación, y explicación de la conducta y la cognición. Asimismo, se construyen argumentos para favorecer una comprensión más integral y elaborada de los programas de investigación acerca de la conducta y la cognición. Con este fin, en la primera sección analizaremos y cuestionaremos tres mitos acerca de la historia de la psicología: la tesis de los paradigmas hegemónicos y los reemplazos revolucionarios, la (...) tesis de los paradigmas incomparables, y la tesis que exige un único paradigma dominante como requisito de cientificidad. Dado que estos mitos se derivan de ciertas ideas problemáticas de Kuhn, en la segunda sección ofreceremos una propuesta alternativa basada en la filosofía de la ciencia de Bunge. En las secciones tercera y cuarta exploraremos los significados de las palabras “conducta” y “cognición”, y su relevancia para corregir ciertos malentendidos que obstaculizan los debates entre los programas de investigación conductistas y cognitivos. En las secciones quinta y la sexta, discutiremos algunos mitos acerca del conductismo y del cognitivismo, y en la última sección ofreceremos algunas conclusiones sobre los temas abordados. Las herramientas que analizaremos permiten establecer un debate más racional entre programas de investigación científica, generar puentes de discusión y desarrollo teórico de una manera más integral y completa, y evitar caer tanto en el dogmatismo y la descalificación injustificada, como en las actitudes eclécticas. (shrink)

The paper contains two yet unknown letters that Feyerabend wrote to Kuhn in 1960 or 1961 on a draft of The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. In these letters, Feyerabend criticises both details of Kuhn's book and its general direction. The letters anticipate many of the arguments that were put forward in the public controversy against Kuhn's position, including some of the (numerous) misunderstandings. Feyerabend's assertions and arguments are very characteristic of his position in the early sixties.

The social sciences are witnessing renewed enthusiasm for sociobiological accounts of human behaviour. Feminist theory has, understandably, tended to engage cautiously with biological reasoning, because women have often been poorly served by the politics of such research. It is important, though, that feminists continue to contribute to this literature, in order to challenge problematic discourses that may emerge. The present paper seeks to analyse a domain of sociobiology that has been the focus of recent controversy: an evolutionary explanation of rape. (...) Particular attention is given to the way in which women's traumatic experience of rape is constructed within this framework. It is argued that women's psychological pain is contorted, via the strategies of (a) diminishing women's pain and (b) ignoring their experience altogether. The operation of these two strategies is illuminated, and their practical consequences in the domains of legal reform and the depoliticization of science are evaluated. (shrink)