Abordamos aqui a influência do método de Condillac sobre a história da química. Partindo da confessada dívida de Lavoisier com o abade, propomo-nos a avaliar o aporte que o método condillaquiano terá para a filosofia natural da segunda metade do XVIII, colocando-a primeiramente na perspectiva da onda newtoniana que contaminou progressivamente as ciências a partir do fim do XVII. Mostramos então como o método de Newton, via alquimia, é capaz de inserir aspectos alheios ao mecanicismo estrito nas discussões, o que (...) garantirá à química legitimidade para se valer de conceitos como atrações e afinidades. Mais tarde, ao constituir e sistematizar um método geral de conhecimento marcado pelo modelo newtoniano, Condillac legará aos naturalistas meios para ordenar proficuamente novas regiões de conhecimento. Quando adequadamente adaptado por Lavoisier aos problemas químicos, este método promoverá a “revolução” da química, ou seu estabelecimento definitivo como ciência positiva. (shrink)

Dans la première moitié du xixe siècle en Angleterre, autour de Charles babbage (1791–1871), John F. W. Herschel (1792–1871), George Peacock (1791–1858), Duncan F. Gregory (1813–1844), Augustus de Morgan (1806–1871), George Boole (1815–1864), et d'autres auteurs moins connus, un réseau d'algébristes renouvelle singulièrement la conception de l'algèbre, à tel point que leur travail est le plus souvent interprété comme émergence des travaux sur l'algèbre abstraite. Comme ces algébristes sont également des réformateurs impliqués dans la réorganisation de la science, il s'agira (...) de proposer de ces travaux une lecture plus contextuelle, afin d'éclairer leur inscription parmi les effects de la Révolution industrielle (1760–1830), et d'analyser leur rôle de médiation culturelle entre les racines d'un savoir universitaire fondé sur la fidélité aux Anciens, et de nouvelles formes d'élaboration des connaissances. Une médiation marquée par un premier rapprochement entre algèbre et logique. (shrink)

There is an enduring story about empiricism, which runs as follows: from Locke onwards to Carnap, empiricism is the doctrine in which raw sense-data are received through the passive mechanism of perception; experience is the effect produced by external reality on the mind or ‘receptors’. Empiricism on this view is the ‘handmaiden’ of experimental natural science, seeking to redefine philosophy and its methods in conformity with the results of modern science. Secondly, there is a story about materialism, popularized initially by (...) Marx and Engels and later restated as standard, ‘textbook’ history of philosophy in the English-speaking world. It portrays materialism as explicitly mechanistic, seeking to reduce the world of qualities, sensations, and purposive behaviour to a quantitative, usually deterministic physical scheme. Building on some recent scholarship, I aim to articulate the contrarian view according to which neither of these stories is true. On the contrary, empiricism turns out to be less ‘science-friendly’ and more concerned with moral matters; materialism reveals itself to be, in at least a large number of cases, a ‘vital’, anti-mechanistic doctrine which focuses on the unique properties of organic beings. This revision of two key philosophical episodes should reveal that our history of early modern philosophy is dependent to a great extent on ‘special interests’, whether positivistic or Kantian, and by extension lead us to rethink the relation and distinction between ‘science’ and ‘philosophy’ in this period. (shrink)