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  1. Whewell’s hylomorphism as a metaphorical explanation for how mind and world merge.Ragnar van der Merwe - 2023 - Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 54 (1):19-38.
    William Whewell’s 19th century philosophy of science is sometimes glossed over as a footnote to Kant. There is however a key feature of Whewell’s account worth noting. This is his appeal to Aristotle’s form/matter hylomorphism as a metaphor to explain how mind and world merge in successful scientific inquiry. Whewell’s hylomorphism suggests a middle way between rationalism and empiricism reminiscent of experience pragmatists like Steven Levine’s view that mind and world are entwined in experience. I argue however that Levine does (...)
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  • Whewell on the ultimate problem of philosophy.Margaret Morrison - 1997 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 28 (3):417-437.
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  • W. Whewell: Induction and Deduction in Novum Organon Renovatum.А. С Омолоева & А. Е Симбирцева - 2023 - Siberian Journal of Philosophy 20 (4):113-126.
    The paper aims to expose the induction – deduction relation within W. Whewell’s treatise «Novum Organon Renovatum». Since Aristotle’s time. induction and deduction have been interpreted as independent and even «opposite» inferences (ways of connecting premises and conclusions), but this intuition is violated in W. Whewell’s works. Based on contemporary practice of some specific natural sciences W. Whewell quite reasonably concludes that “Aristotle overlooks a step which is of far more importance to our knowledge, namely, the invention of the second (...)
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  • On Walsh's reading of Whewell's view of necessity.Robert E. Butts - 1965 - Philosophy of Science 32 (2):175-181.
    In a recent paper,[3], Harold T. Walsh has argued that Whewell's commentators have in the past misunderstood his use of “necessary,” that Whewell's theory of necessary truth developed only gradually through thirty years of scholarly activity, finally finding a “mature” expression in Philosophy of Discovery, published in 1860, and that a proper understanding of Whewell's “mature” theory of necessary truth leads to a fundamental re-interpretation of the nature of the Ideas and of their role in scientific systems—that the meaning of (...)
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