I shall mean by ‘cosmic imagination’, first, the mental appropriating of objects, events, processes or patterns perceived in nature-atlarge, so as to apply them in articulating our own scheme of values, and in our quest for self-understanding. I shall apply the phrase also to the synthesising activity of the mind in our appraising of items in wider nature itself or as a whole – whether we believe nature to have no value save what we choose to confer or project on (...) it, or take it to have a value that sets limits on our appropriation, benign or exploitative. (shrink)

This article underlines the relevance of Mikel Dufrenne's early works (published between 1946 and 1953) for contemporary social sciences. Indeed, Dufrenne was interested in American cultural anthropology, and in Abram Kardiner's concept of “basic personality” in particular. Dufrenne tested Kardiner's concept against Kant's transcendental tradition and the phenomenological theory of Mitsein (the concept of being-with). More importantly, in this article, I demonstrate that Dufrenne's project raises the psychological question of the historicity of categories of experience.

In this paper I shall attempt to give an enactive account of the dynamic qualities of music. Starting from Krueger’s account of musical experience, I will highlight how music’s qualities of movement are constituted in the horizon of an embodied consciousness – that is, an embodied subject who can virtually or actually bodily entrain with music and then follow the musical profile. I will argue that the common rythmòs-structure of both music and movement makes such an enactive constitution possible. In (...) this sense, the perception of music’s rythmòs – that is, the perception of its teleological tendency – will turn out to be the condition of possibility for the enaction of music dynamic qualities. But if so, music’s quality of being teleologically-structured will remain unexplained by the discussed enactive account and will need another description of how it is constituted in the horizon of consciousness. (shrink)

While reading literary works, what do readers experience? Do they experience only the words they listen to or read? How can we describe the experience of reading literary works? Do phantasy and imagination play any role during such experiences? These kinds of questions usually give rise to a twofold kind of research: on the one hand, a philosophical effort of combing through literature itself as a philosophical object of study, and — on the other hand — an attempt to argue (...) for a cognitive portrait of those processes triggered by reading or listening to words. Nevertheless, if we put aside these two sets of studies, which are plenty widespread and partly related to scientific branches, three new and interwoven ways of broaching the issue of literary experience come to light: 1) readers’ experiences of literary worlds; 2) readers’ visual involvement in literary experiences; 3) phantasy’s and imagination’s involvement in such experiences. These issues are strongly interwoven since each of them deals with the experience of reading literary works from slightly different perspectives: the first concerns the objects of literary experiences, the second focuses on a specific component of literary experiences, while the third aims at comprehending what role is up to phantasy and imagination during such experiences. The following research purports to answer the aforementioned questions and, in so doing, it develops and argues for the following thesis, which is the heart of the matter: reading literary works means experiencing literary worlds and, consequently, describing literary experiences means describing the literary worlds we experience while reading literary works. (shrink)