Methodological divisions in sociology, the study of the social, are not just deep and persistent but patterned—most obviously in the separate development of qualitative methods in ethnography and grounded theory, but also in subsidiary divisions within those separations, following the same pattern. The pattern being too deep-rooted to be explained as empirical happenstance, it will be explored here as the effect of an equally deep-rooted condition. More exactly, through postulating that sociology’s subject-matter, the social, is ontologically rooted in an essential (...) ambiguity between abstraction and individuation. Four criteria are drawn from the idea of the dichotomy being constitutively essential, which this or any alternative candidates must meet. The article conducts the postulate through the criteria, and applies the criterion of separating better from worse sociological theory to the work of Pierre Bourdieu. (shrink)

Current debates on recognition and domination tend to be characterized by two polarized positions. Where the “anti-recognition” camp views recognition as a tool for establishing and reproducing relations of power, the “pro-recognition” camp conceives it as a way for dominated individuals and social groups to lay stake to intersubjective relations that are more just. At first glance, Honneth’s normative theory of recognition and Bourdieu’s critical sociology of domination also divide along these lines. Honneth takes the pro-recognition stance, criticizing the French (...) sociologist for adopting a “fragmented” conception of the social world that ignores the “moral consensus” underlying each claim for mutual recognition. In contrast, Bourdieu accuses the German philosopher of endorsing an “enchanted” view of the social world that misrecognizes the way that recognition perpetuates symbolic domination. However, through a close and nuanced reading of their works, this article suggests that, in spite of this difference, Honneth’s and Bourdieu’s theories nonetheless converge on the idea that recognition is neither “good” nor “bad” per se, but “structurally ambiguous” in its relations to symbolic domination. (shrink)