This article engages the role of temporality in the work of Thomas Hobbes. Rather than focusing on the political individual proposed by his later works, it politicizes the conception of subjectivity advanced in his earlier works. In these, he advances a materialist account of subjectivity that is conceptualized in entirely temporal terms. It is, he argues, the temporal categories of memory and imagination that make humans uniquely capable of selfhood and freedom. This early conception lacks the tendency towards domination described (...) in Leviathan, in which the state of nature is presented as a war of all against all. However, this article argues that what the state of nature reveals is that the temporality of subjectivity is not objective, but rather socially produced. As such, the state of nature depicts behavior resulting from material anxiety, which prevents thinking, and therefore acting, beyond the present. Political institutions therefore emerge in his thought as a mechanism for quelling anxiety such that the future becomes actionable. By projecting a vision of a secure, open future, these institutions create a present in which meaningful, self-directed actions become possible. That is, he is the first to posit the very modern notion that political institutions fundamentally shape our sense of possibility. (shrink)