I present some problems for phenomenal (i.e. consciousness-based) accounts of personal identity and egoistic concern. These accounts typically rely on continuity in the capacity for consciousness to explain how we survive ordinary periods of unconsciousness such as dreamless sleep. I offer some thought experiments where continuity in the capacity for consciousness does not seem sufficient for survival and some where it does not seem necessary. There are ways of modifying the standard phenomenal approach so as to avoid these difficulties, but (...) I argue that they all lead to other problems that are no less serious. (shrink)

How do we persist over time: What conditions need to be fulfilled for us to remain the same person from one moment to the next? Two theories have dominated the debate for a longtime: the physical and psychological approaches, which are centred on sameness of body and sameness of psychology, respectively. This thesis will focus on a third theory, the phenomenal approach, which defines persistence as the sameness of consciousness. That is, what is required for persistence is a continuous stream (...) of consciousness. In part 1, I will present and analyse two different arguments that advocate for the phenomenal approach and I will also offer criticism for each argument individually. In part 2 I will present criticism that is directed to both arguments and the view as a whole. I will argue that the phenomenal approach to personal identity over time is an intuitive and convincing alternative at first glance but after deeper analysis it is an inadequate and unsatisfactory argument for personal persistence. Both arguments defend the capacity for consciousness as the condition for persistence but neither is able to define what has the capacity for consciousness and how it could persist without consciousness in a meaningful way. (shrink)