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  1. Pascal's Wager as a Decision Under Ignorance.André Neiva - forthcoming - Erkenntnis:1-25.
    In this paper, I examine Pascal's Wager as a decision problem where the uncertainty is massive, that is, as a decision under ignorance. I first present several reasons to support this interpretation. Then, I argue that wagering for God is the optimal act in a broad range of cases, according to two well-known criteria for decision-making: the Minimax Regret rule and the Hurwicz criterion. Given a Pascalian standard matrix, I also show that a tie between wagering for God and wagering (...)
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  • Pascal’s Wager and Decision-making with Imprecise Probabilities.André Neiva - 2023 - Philosophia 51 (3):1479-1508.
    Unlike other classical arguments for the existence of God, Pascal’s Wager provides a pragmatic rationale for theistic belief. Its most popular version says that it is rationally mandatory to choose a way of life that seeks to cultivate belief in God because this is the option of maximum expected utility. Despite its initial attractiveness, this long-standing argument has been subject to various criticisms by many philosophers. What is less discussed, however, is the rationality of this choice in situations where the (...)
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