This article explains Kant’s claim that sciences must take, at least as their ideal, the form of a ‘system’. I argue that Kant’s notion of systematicity can be understood against the background of de Jong & Betti’s Classical Model of Science (2010) and the writings of Georg Friedrich Meier and Johann Heinrich Lambert. According to my interpretation, Meier, Lambert, and Kant accepted an axiomatic idea of science, articulated by the Classical Model, which elucidates their conceptions of systematicity. I show that (...) Kant’s critique of the mathematical method is compatible with his adherence to this axiomatic conception of science. I further show that systematicity furthers traditionally accepted logical ideals of scientific knowledge, which explains why Meier and Kant think that sciences must be ‘systematic’. (shrink)

Ernst Mayr argued that the emergence of biology as a special science in the early nineteenth century was possible due to the demise of the mathematical model of science and its insistence on demonstrative knowledge. More recently, John Zammito has claimed that the rise of biology as a special science was due to a distinctive experimental, anti-metaphysical, anti-mathematical, and anti-rationalist strand of thought coming from outside of Germany. In this paper we argue that this narrative neglects the important role played (...) by the mathematical and axiomatic model of science in the emergence of biology as a special science. We show that several major actors involved in the emergence of biology as a science in Germany were working with an axiomatic conception of science that goes back at least to Aristotle and was popular in mid-eighteenth-century German academic circles due to its endorsement by Christian Wolff. More specifically, we show that at least two major contributors to the emergence of biology in Germany—Caspar Friedrich Wolff and Gottfried Reinhold Treviranus—sought to provide a conception of the new science of life that satisfies the criteria of a traditional axiomatic ideal of science. Both C.F. Wolff and Treviranus took over strong commitments to the axiomatic model of science from major philosophers of their time, Christian Wolff and Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph Schelling, respectively. The ideal of biology as an axiomatic science with specific biological fundamental concepts and principles thus played a role in the emergence of biology as a special science. (shrink)

This paper gives a contextualized reading of Kant's theory of real definitions in geometry. Though Leibniz, Wolff, Lambert and Kant all believe that definitions in geometry must be ‘real’, they disagree about what a real definition is. These disagreements are made vivid by looking at two of Euclid's definitions. I argue that Kant accepted Euclid's definition of circle and rejected his definition of parallel lines because his conception of mathematics placed uniquely stringent requirements on real definitions in geometry. Leibniz, Wolff (...) and Lambert thus accept definitions that Kant rejects because they assign weaker roles to real definitions. (shrink)

Se ha intentado realizar una traducción literal del texto de Lambert. En contadas ocasiones se han substituido construcciones sintácticas del alemán por otras que facilitan, a juicio del traductor, la lectura del texto en español. Asimismo, en algunos pasajes se han alterado los signos de puntuación, con la finalidad señalada.

L’article vise à examiner les caractéristiques de la systématicité chez Johann Heinrich Lambert. Influencé par Christian Wolff, Lambert élabore une doctrine originale de l’architectonique qui comprend pour l’essentiel deux parties : d’une part, une manière de déterminer la représentation systématique dans la perception sensible qui constitue une première façon de connaître des rapports entre vérités. D’autre part, une théorie de l’harmonie réelle des vérités qui permet d’unifier des relations conceptuelles et propositionnelles et qui a comme avantages de mieux déceler les (...) erreurs et de contrer le scepticisme. L’article a également pour objectif de montrer que la conception architectonique des vérités chez Lambert est certes fondationnaliste, mais ne saurait constituer une forme d’holisme. (shrink)