Three kinds of knowledge usually recognised by epistemologists are identified and their relevance for curriculum design is discussed. These are: propositional knowledge, know-how and knowledge by acquaintance. The inferential nature of propositional knowledge is argued for and it is suggested that propositional knowledge in fact presupposes the ability to know how to make appropriate inferences within a body of knowledge, whether systematic or unsystematic. This thesis is developed along lines suggested in the earlier work of Paul Hirst. The different kinds (...) of know-how and their relationships are discussed and it is suggested that they occupy different places and different relationships in any curricular hierarchy. The changing role that knowledge by acquaintance plays within this hierarchy is also discussed. Implications of this account for the current National Curriculum and for curriculum design more generally are discussed, looking at History, Science and Design Technology as examples. (shrink)

Although the theory of Jean Piaget is correctly characterized as genetic epistemology, its nature and scope remain unclear and controversial. An examination of Piaget's Introduction a l'epistemologie genetique indicates that Piaget relies heavily upon a model of comparative anatomy and, consequently, that genetic epistemology is about both the history of science and individual development. This biological model seems to be the basis for Piaget's view that the history of science can be seen as a (Kantian) history of scientific concepts whereas (...) psychogenetic development is a history of these very same concepts on the individual level. Finally, although there are passages indicating a different interpretation of the scope of genetic epistemology, I give several reasons for preferring the more liberal interpretation. (shrink)

Bernadette M Tobin; Richard Peters's Theory of Moral Development, Journal of Philosophy of Education, Volume 23, Issue 1, 30 May 2006, Pages 15–27, https://doi.

Gerry Gaden; Rehabilitating Responsibility, Journal of Philosophy of Education, Volume 24, Issue 1, 30 May 2006, Pages 27–38, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-975.

Richard Smith; Learning from Experience, Journal of Philosophy of Education, Volume 21, Issue 1, 30 May 2006, Pages 37–46, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9752.1.

Christine Atkinson; Beginning to Learn, Journal of Philosophy of Education, Volume 16, Issue 1, 30 May 2006, Pages 69–76, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9752.19.

John Wilson; Making Subjects Interesting, Journal of Philosophy of Education, Volume 21, Issue 2, 30 May 2006, Pages 215–222, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-975.

David e cooper has argued that it makes no sense to credit a young child with beliefs or concepts of any sort, since the young child lacks a fairly sophisticated linguistic system. in my paper i attempt to show that such a position cannot consistently be maintained. in fact, most of the arguments put forward by cooper to defend his position implicitly assume that the child has a conceptual system of some kind.

‘Every education teaches a philosophy; if not by dogma then by suggestion, by implication, by atmosphere. Every part of that education has a connection with every other part. If it does not all combine to convey some general view of life it is not education at all’ . In an essay written for the thirtieth volume of the British Journal of Educational Studies , R. F. Dearden surveyed philosophy of education during the period 1952–82. As might be imagined he was (...) largely concerned with the emergence in and development through these years of analytical philosophy of education, as the influence of linguistic or conceptual analysis spread beyond the somewhat ill-defined boundaries of core philosophy and was taken up by those interested in the theoretical presuppositions of educational practice. After charting the course of this development, and having reached the point at which certain worries arose about the limits of conceptual analysis as a method, Dearden turned to consider what if any alternatives might be available. The first possibility which he mentions in expectation of its having received explicit articulation is Catholic philosophy of education. However, as he notes, nothing meeting this description was developed during the period in question—in effect, since the war. The one book which he mentions, viz. Jacques Maritain's Education at the Crossroads , is barely known of in professional philosophy of education and in style and content is quite out of the mainstream. (shrink)

Malcolm Jones; Innate Powers, Concepts and Knowledge: a critique of D. W. Hamlyn's account of concept possession, Journal of Philosophy of Education, Volume 15.