The temporal granularity of consciousness may be far less fine than the real-time information processing mechanisms that underlie our sensitivity to small temporal differences. It is suggested that conscious time perception, like space perception, is subject to errors that belie a unitary underlying representation. E. R. Clay's concept of the “specious present,” an extended moment represented in consciousness, is suggested as an alternative to the more common notion of instantaneous experience that underlies much reasoning based on the “time of arrival” (...) in consciousness. (shrink)

There are problems with both the theoretical logic and the interpretation of data in Christie and Barresi's interesting article. The general pattern of results is easily incorporated into an information-processing framework compatible with Dennett's analysis. In particular, different aspects of the illusory motion event are queried at different times and these aspects are not in conflict, so no revision of conscious content is necessary. Second, too much interpretive weight is placed on an anomalous pair of data points that do not (...) seem fully interpretable within the author's framework and are probably susceptible to one of several alternative interpretations proposed here, though further investigation is necessary. (shrink)