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Compulsion and moral concepts

Ethics 78 (3):227-233 (1968)

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  1. Coercive Interference and Moral Judgment.Jan-Willem van der Rijt - 2011 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 14 (5):549 - 567.
    Coercion is by its very nature hostile to the individual subjected to it. At the same time, it often is a necessary evil: political life cannot function without at least some instances of coercion. Hence, it is not surprising that coercion has been the topic of heated philosophical debate for many decades. Though numerous accounts have been put forth in the literature, relatively little attention has been paid to the question what exactly being subjected to coercion does to an individual (...)
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  • Law and Coercion.Robert C. Hughes - 2013 - Philosophy Compass 8 (3):231-240.
    Though political philosophers often presuppose that coercive enforcement is fundamental to law, many legal philosophers have doubted this. This article explores doubts of two types. Some legal philosophers argue that given an adequate account of coercion and coerciveness, the enforcement of law in actual legal systems will generally not count as coercive. Others accept that actual legal systems enforce many laws coercively, but they deny that law has a necessary connection with coercion. There can be individual laws that lack coercive (...)
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  • Freedom in organizations.Michael Keeley - 1987 - Journal of Business Ethics 6 (4):249 - 263.
    Organizations in competitive markets are often assumed to be voluntary associations, involving free exchange between various participants for mutual benefit. Just how voluntary or free organizational exchanges really are, however, is problematic. Even the criteria for determining whether specific transactions are free or coerced are not clear. In this paper, I review three general approaches to specifying such criteria: consequentialist, descriptive, and normative. I argue that the last is the most reasonable, that freedom is an essentially moral concept, whose meaning (...)
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