El artículo aborda la Teoría de la Constitución de Carl Schmitt, atendiendo a su doble acepción de teoría general de la constitución moderna y cuerpo de doctrina acerca de la constitución de Weimar. El primer apartado presenta la sistemática de la teoría positiva de la constitución moderna, reponiendo sus dos elementos estructurantes: la forma política resultante de la aplicación de los principios político-formales de identidad y representación, y las formas de legislación y gobierno propias del Estado de derecho burgués. La (...) segunda parte se centra en el cuerpo de doctrina acerca de la constitución de Weimar que Schmitt desarrolla apelando a las categorías presentadas en la primera parte. En especial, se analizan sus implicancias para comprender la posición de Schmitt respecto a los principales desafíos doctrinarios de la época, contrastando sus posiciones con las de otros grandes juristas contemporáneos. Finalmente, se recapitulan las conexiones de sentido entre los criterios que informan la teoría general de la constitución moderna y la doctrina de la constitución de Weimar, destacando las peculiaridades del esfuerzo de Schmitt por subrayar la integridad de la constitución frente a los diversos modos de relativización que atribuye tanto al positivismo jurídico como a ciertas posiciones políticas de su época. (shrink)

The piece responds to critics of Scheuerman’s END OF LAW: CARL SCHMIT IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY. Despite our disagreements, the book’s critics and I share the view that Schmitt speaks to our times, albeit in deeply troubling ways. Precisely how and why Schmitt remains pertinent, however, remains a matter of dispute. Inspired by the un-Schmittian hope that deliberation might buttress our common quest to overcome democracy’s present crisis, my response endeavours to identify those disagreements. Though I am unable to address (...) all of them satisfactorily, my aim is to advance our conversation. Most important, the critics and I disagree somewhat about how best to understand Schmitt’s relationship to contemporary authoritarian populism. (shrink)

This article focuses on theoretical reflections on sovereignty and constitutionalism in the context of the globalization and Europeanisation of the nation states, their politics, and legal systems. Starting from a critical assessment of the Kelsen-Schmitt polemic, the author claims that sovereignty needs to be analysed by the sociological method in order to disclose its current structural differentiation. The constitution of society may be imagined as the multitude of self-constituted and functionally differentiated social subsystems. The constitutional pluralism argument subsequently reconceptualizes sovereignty (...) as socially differentiated and divided between specific subsystems. The EU's differentiated constitutional domain and the paradox of divided sovereignty are used as examples of profound structural and semantic changes in contemporary national and transnational societies. While the sovereign nation-state institutions have become marginalized in political structures of European societies, the self-constitutionalization of the functionally differentiated EU legal system proceeds by internalizing the concept of divided sovereignty and using it semantically as its mode of self-reference. (shrink)

This article analyses the reception of John Rawls's thought by Otfried Höffe, Jürgen Habermas and other political theorists on the German liberal left. It argues that, ironically, as Rawls's theory has become more historically self-conscious and sociologically oriented since A Theory of Justice, Habermas, while denying any fundamental difference between him and Rawls in this `neo-Kantian family quarrel', has moved in the opposite direction. One might even say that there has been some mid-Atlantic convergence in political theory. Nevertheless, there remain (...) peculiarities of German political thought, in particular its more sociological bent, a (positive or negative) fixation on the state, and the persistently felt need finally to reconcile a perceived conflict between liberalism and democracy. (shrink)

It is well known that Hans Kelsen and Jürgen Habermas invoke realist arguments drawn from social science in defending an international, democratic human rights regime against Carl Schmitt’s attack on the rule of law. However, despite embracing the realist spirit of Kelsen’s legal positivism, Habermas criticizes Kelsen for neglecting to connect the rule of law with a concept of procedural justice (Part I). I argue, to the contrary (Part II), that Kelsen does connect these terms, albeit in a manner that (...) may be best described as functional, rather than conceptual. Indeed, whereas Habermas tends to emphasize a conceptual connection between law and morality, and has even been tempted by natural law arguments in developing his theory of jurisprudence (see Part IV), Kelsen is more receptive to arguments drawn from legal and political realism. Yet Habermas is hardly oblivious to these arguments, as can be seen from his recent acknowledgment that human rights that secure subsistence and development depend on ‘global domestic policy’ for their full enjoyment. This acknowledgment, I submit, brings Habermas’ legal philosophy closer to Kelsen’s monistic view that a supranational human rights regime must regulate political as well as purely legal matters (Part III). Given this stronger analogy between domestic and global institutions of governance, I argue (Part IV) that a global human rights regime must also incorporate features of constitutional review. Conceding this point, however, raises further questions about the insulation of international law from so-called extra-legal (political) influences. I conclude that not only do multicultural differences in understanding human rights (conflicts between legal paradigms) generate political problems for international courts but so do competing subsystems of international law. (shrink)

In the Preussen contra Reich case of 1932, Carl Schmitt’s theories on equal chance and law in extreme conditions are interpreted and applied in a court of law, firstly by Schmitt himself, then, going contrary to Schmitt’s interpretation, by Dr. Arnold Brecht and Dr. Hans Peters. This paper will first present the basis of the two theories from Schmitt’s “Legality and Legitimacy,” namely, equal chance and the need for extraordinary measures. Then this paper will focus on the diverging legal interpretations (...) of these two theories, as presented in court by different legal theorists. These divergent interpretations of “equal chance” and “law in extreme conditions,” as presented in the aforementioned case, have yet to reach an international readership, as the case itself has never been fully translated into English. Finally, this paper will question the practical application of the two theories in the reality of the empirical world, which in turn question the relationship between any parliamentary legislative system and law. (shrink)

Tärkeä ulottuvuus modernissa tavassa ajatella politiikkaa on erottelu politiikan ja talouden välillä. Tässä artikkelissa käsittelen tätä erottelua konservatiivisen oikeustieteilijä Carl Schmittin poliittisessa teoriassa ja varsinkin hänen talousliberalismin kritiikissään. Liberalismi rajasi Schmittin mukaan talouden omaksi autonomiseksi alueekseen pyrkimällä rajaamaan valtiovallan oikeutta vaikuttaa siihen. Tämä kuitenkin johti hänen mielestään poliittisen siirtymiseen valtiolta talouteen, eli taloudellisten suhteiden politisointiin. Artikkelini analysoi Schmittin kritiikin ohella myös hänen omaa teoriaansa vahvasta valtiosta. Schmitt vastasi liberalismin heikkouteen argumentoimalla, että vain vahva valtio voi ylläpitää talouden autonomisuutta. Argumenttini on, (...) että toimiessaan näin Schmitt ei lopulta ylitä modernille poliittisella ajattelulle ominaista erottelua valtion ja yhteiskunnan välillä. Päinvastoin, Schmittiä ja liberalismia yhdistää pyrkimys tavalla tai toisella erotella talous politiikasta. Artikkelini avulla voidaan monipuolistaa sitä kuvaa, joka poliittisessa filosofiassa ja teoriassa on talouspolitiikan ja -hallinnon historiasta. Argumenttini vahvistaa ajatusta siitä, että käsitteellinen erottelu talouden ja politiikan välillä on perustavanlaatuinen modernille poliittiselle ajattelulle. (shrink)

Išplitusio moralinio nihilizmo bei klasikinio moralinio realizmo problemų ir kritikos kontekste teisininkų etikos vertybių galimybė įgyti daugiau ar mažiau realų pavidalą bei įgauti priimtino modelio formą yra tapusi neapibrėžta. Kita vertus, akademinėje ir ypač profesinėje teisininkų bendruomenėje teisininko buvimo etišku reikšmė ir poreikis vis labiau akcentuojami. Analitiškai ir kritiškai aptarus tokį status quo šiame straipsnyje pristatoma alternatyvi teisininkų etikos vertybių realaus egzistavimo perspektyva, taip pat formuluojant teisininkų etikos modeliavimo gaires. Ši perspektyva remiasi subjektyviąja ontologija ir pamatiniais moralinio proto principais: altruizmu (...) ir teisingumo kaip proporcinės lygybės nuostata. (shrink)