ABSTRACT Though the notion of a scientific textbook has been around for almost three centuries, the category has hardly been stable. The plasticity of the textbook genre may be illustrated by recent variations as well as long-term trends. In this brief essay I examine two idiosyncratic but highly successful physics books, each published in the mid 1970s, whose production, marketing, and adoption reveal some of the slippage between such categories as textbook, scholarly monograph, and popular best seller.

Knowledge transfer across different contexts has become an increasingly prevalent feature of current science. As such, it is a relevant topic also for history and philosophy of science. This special issue presents a set of papers that study knowledge transfer in various disciplines. The contributions approach the topic from either an integrated history and philosophy of science perspective, 2) a systematic philosophical perspective, or 3) a historical perspective. This overview article is organized in three sections. The introduction provides some background (...) and context of the topic. The second section specifies the three components of knowledge transfer, i.e., knowledge, context, and the transfer process. It motivates our take on this topic and then outlines the central ideas of each paper. The third section reflects on the kinds of methods used to study processes of knowledge transfer. The article concludes by highlighting some of the features of such processes, some of the main challenges and obstacles that those processes involve, and possible ways of dealing with them. (shrink)

ABSTRACT Though the notion of a scientific textbook has been around for almost three centuries, the category has hardly been stable. The plasticity of the textbook genre may be illustrated by recent variations as well as long-term trends. In this brief essay I examine two idiosyncratic but highly successful physics books, each published in the mid 1970s, whose production, marketing, and adoption reveal some of the slippage between such categories as textbook, scholarly monograph, and popular best seller.

The present paper revisits the debate between realists about gravitational energy in GR and anti-realists/eliminativists. I re-assess the arguments underpinning Hoefer’s seminal eliminativist stance, and those of their realist detractors’ responses. A more circumspect reading of the former is proffered that discloses where the so far not fully appreciated, real challenges lie for realism about gravitational energy. I subsequently turn to Lam and Read’s recent proposals for such a realism. Their arguments are critically examined. Special attention is devoted to the (...) adequacy of Read’s appeals to functionalism, imported from the philosophy of mind. (shrink)