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This paper aims to elucidate the Kantian notion of the “concept of an object in general”. In a passage from the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant offers a clue to this by indicating that the categories are the concepts that define the object in general. This paper seeks to clarify the notion of “concept of an object in general” by analyzing how the relationship between categories and the object is to be understood. For this, it first explains the Kantian doctrine (...) |
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In recent years non-conceptual content theorists have taken Kant as a reference point on account of his notion of intuition (§§ 1-2). The present work aims at exploring several complementary issues intertwined with the notion of non-conceptual content: of these, the first concerns the role of the intuition as an indexical representation (§ 3), whereas the second applies to the presence of a few epistemic features articulated according to the distinction between knowledge by acquaintance and knowledge by description (§ 4). (...) |
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SummaryThe paper discusses major issues concerning the A104‐10 transcendental‐object theory. For that theory, our de re knowledge becomes related to its object just because our understanding thinks a certain object to stand related to the intuition via which we know. Employing an apparatus of intensional logic, I argue that this thought of an object is to be understood as a certain sort of intuition‐related, de dicto thought. Then I explore how, via such a de dicto thought, we can nevertheless achieve (...) |
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El presente artículo intenta describir la problemática de la noción de objeto trascendental tanto en la discusión exegética sobre la filosofía teórica de Kant, como en la Crítica de la Razón Pura. En primera instancia, se podrá comprobar un consenso en torno a la acepción que el término en discusión asume en la Analítica Trascendental. Sin embargo, los comentaristas no han acertado en distinguir la función del objeto trascendental en la Dialéctica Trascendental. De acuerdo a esto, se intentará desglosar los (...) |
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In this paper I examine Kant''s use of causal language to characterize things in themselves. Following Nicholas Rescher, I contend that Kant''s use of such causal language can only be understood by first coming to grips with the relation of things in themselves to appearances. Unlike Rescher, however, I argue that things in themselves and appearances are not numerically distinct entities. Rather, I claim that it is things in themselves that we are intentionally related to in veridical experience, though of (...) |
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