Qualia are defined as subjective or private feelings associated with sensory and other experiences. This article argues that private feelings might be expressed by or in a personal brain and discusses possible neurobiological implications. Four issues are considered: Functional dualism implies that mental functions are realized as emergent properties of the brain. In practice, functional dualism is compatible with both substance dualism and pan-psychism. The (adult) human brain is the product of biological and environmental processes, including cultural influences, and is (...) individually unique. Part of the cerebral neuronal processing is molded by individual memories and previous experiences. Biological processes underlying the realization of qualia, including neural activities, escape conscious control. The temporal expression of qualia is in part consciously channeled by, for instance, actual situations and cultural habits. Neuroscientific explanations refer to general principles of nature, rather than to individual phenomena. Hence, future neurobiological approaches might aim to identify which neuronal processes are involved in qualia and how. It seems illusory to explain each quale. (shrink)

A response to "I can't get no (epistemic) satisfaction: Why the hard problem of consciousness entails a hard problem of explanation" by Brian Earp.

The last sentence of my article on the neurobiological context of qualia is: “Future neurobiological approaches might identify the neuronal processes involved in qualia and how they are involved, but it seems illusory to us [.. to me] to explain the individual quale”. Accordingly I do agree with Maung that the paper does not solve the “hard problem of Chalmers”. Instead, my article approaches it as a neurobiological problem, not as a philosophical issue. M.