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  1. Dualism and Its Place in a Philosophical Structure for Psychiatry.Hane Htut Maung - 2019 - Medicine, Health Care and Philosophy 22 (1):59-69.
    It is often claimed in parts of the psychiatric literature that neuroscientific research into the biological basis of mental disorder undermines dualism in the philosophy of mind. This paper shows that such a claim does not apply to all forms of dualism. Focusing on Kenneth Kendler’s discussion of the mind–body problem in biological psychiatry, I argue that such criticism of dualism often conflates the psychological and phenomenal concepts of the mental. Moreover, it fails to acknowledge that there are different varieties (...)
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  • In Defence of Chalmers: A Comment on Korf.Hane Htut Maung - 2016 - Dialogues in Philosophy, Mental and Neuro Sciences 9 (1):32-33.
    In “Qualia in a Contemporary Neurobiological Perspective”, Korf tackles the perennial issue of qualia in the philosophy of mind. His discussion is partly a response to Chalmers’ hard problem, which, as evidenced by other recent discussions in Dialogues, remains fresh after nearly two decades. Korf highlights the importance of regarding each brain as a particular shaped by unique contingencies and suggests how neurobiological research might proceed in light of this. However, I argue that his discussion does not address what is (...)
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  • What is It Like to Be a Bee?Brian D. Earp - 2017 - Think 16 (45):43-49.
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  • Adjusting Our Epistemic Expectations: Explaining Experience with Nonreductive Psychophysical Laws.Matthew Soleiman - 2015 - Dialogues in Philosophy, Mental and Neuro Sciences 8 (2):89-90.
    A response to "I can't get no (epistemic) satisfaction: Why the hard problem of consciousness entails a hard problem of explanation" by Brian Earp.
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  • A Short Comment on the "Defence of Chalmers" by Hane Htut Maung.Jakob Korf - 2016 - Dialogues in Philosophy, Mental and Neuro Sciences 9 (2):69-69.
    The last sentence of my article on the neurobiological context of qualia is: “Future neurobiological approaches might identify the neuronal processes involved in qualia and how they are involved, but it seems illusory to us [.. to me] to explain the individual quale”. Accordingly I do agree with Maung that the paper does not solve the “hard problem of Chalmers”. Instead, my article approaches it as a neurobiological problem, not as a philosophical issue. M.
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  • Qualia in a Contemporary Neurobiological Perspective.Jakob Korf - 2015 - Dialogues in Philosophy, Mental and Neuro Sciences 8 (2):39-44.
    Qualia are defined as subjective or private feelings associated with sensory and other experiences. This article argues that private feelings might be expressed by or in a personal brain and discusses possible neurobiological implications. Four issues are considered: Functional dualism implies that mental functions are realized as emergent properties of the brain. In practice, functional dualism is compatible with both substance dualism and pan-psychism. The (adult) human brain is the product of biological and environmental processes, including cultural influences, and is (...)
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