Personhood constitutes the pivotal point in the abortion debate. There exists a diversity of views as to when foetal personhood actually starts—from conception and implantation to viability and even birth. One perspective that has lost support for decades is that of quickening, a stance associated with Lord Ellenborough’s 1803 Act. This paper attempts to put quickening back into the limelight, albeit through a new interpretation. After discussing its philosophy and underpinning rationale, I will assess a number of arguments that have (...) been directed against quickening as a viable point of distinction. I conclude by suggesting that according to modern proponents of quickening proponents, rational soul ensoulment begins after a certain degree of cerebral cortical formation has been realized, thus marking foetal volition, which promotes foetal interests, for the first time. (shrink)

The State may require an autopsy when foul play is suspected in the death of one of its citizens.[1] This is so regardless of any objections to such invasive procedures expressed by the deceased before their deaths or afterward by their families. There is not even a religious exemption. The most obvious explanation for why consent is not needed is that apprehending a murderer with information obtained from the autopsy can save lives. However, taking organs without consent from the deceased (...) for transplantation into those suffering vital organ failures can also save lives. But doing so is considered beyond the pale. The question then becomes why are mandatory autopsies permitted but organ conscription prohibited? Our aim is to explore whether such divergent attitudes can be justified. (shrink)

A surgical head-transplant technique, HEAVEN, promises to offer significantly improved quality of life for quadriplegics and others whose minds are functional, but whose bodies require artificial support to continue living. HEAVEN putatively actualizes a thought-experiment long debated by philosophers concerning the definition of personhood and criterion of personal identity through time and change. HEAVEN’s advocates presume to preserve the identity of the person whose head is transplanted onto another’s living body, leaving one’s previous body behind as one would their corpse. (...) Various classical and contemporary theories of personhood and personal identity would support this presumption, while others would contest it as providing an accurate or complete view of what is essential for a human person to persist through this procedure. This paper brings such theories to bear in analyzing whether HEAVEN can indeed deliver on its promise of complete ontological survival for the person whose head is transplanted. (shrink)

Metaphysics often has an important role in deciding ethical questions. Specifically, in the realm of bioethics, metaphysical questions such as the nature of persons, diseases, and properties in general can be crucial to determining what is right or wrong. In this article, I tie together various metaphysical themes that recur throughout the rest of the issue: rationality as an element of human nature, ontological classifications, and kinds of action. I will explain that each has ethical implications. Actions that contravene reason (...) will be morally problematic, whereas our classification of illnesses will have important implications for how we ought to respond to ill persons. Metaphysical questions appear, or are at least suggested, in each article, pointing to the need for metaphysics in answering bioethical questions. (shrink)

Recently, Verheijde and Potts (2011) have called into question the whole-brain death (WBD) criterion and, in particular, have taken issue with my admittedly limited defense of WBD. I would like to thank Verheijde and Potts for their comments and for identifying key points in the debate that need further clarification and defense. This article is an attempt to provide such clarification and to focus on Verheijde and Potts’s key argument against me and other proponents of WBD. The structure of this (...) reply is first to clear away some misunderstandings and to articulate further some of my original arguments. These clarifications are necessary to acuminate attention to what is, I believe, the fundamental locus of disagreement between proponents of WBD and its detractors. Detractors assert that patients who satisfy WBD can still evince integrated functioning. On the assumption that persons are not dead yet if they can manifest integrated functioning, WBD is not a reliable indicator of death. In the second section, I address this fundamental point of disagreement, arguing that with no (known) exceptions, patients satisfying WBD require external support (e.g., ventilator) in order to maintain integrated functioning. This fact is important because on the account of the person I endorse, one which I think is plausible, the soul confers on the body certain vital potencies. When the body itself has lost such potencies, we have evidence of the soul not being present. Emphasizing the aspect of self-integration that is characteristic of living human beings avoids the challenge that WBD persons are still alive. In the third section, however, I address what I take to be Verheijde and Potts’s strongest objection against WBD criterion, namely the objection from spontaneous circulation. The responses to this objection point to the fundamental and limited role the WBD criterion is meant to play in organ donation decisions. (shrink)