Pacifism is the view that necessarily, the nonconsensual harming of pro tanto rights-bearers is all-things-considered morally impermissible. Critics of pacifism frequently point to common moral intuitions about self-defenders and other-defenders as evidence that pacifism is false and that self- and other-defense are often morally justified. I call this the Justification View and defend its rival, the Excuse View. According to the latter, a robust view of moral excuse adequately explains the common moral intuitions invoked against pacifism and is compatible with (...) pacifism. The paper proceeds in five steps. First, I identify ten intuitive data points that require explanation. Second, I introduce the justification/excuse distinction. Third, I demonstrate the Excuse View’s equal explanatory power with respect to the intuitive data. Fourth, I defend the Fair Use Principle: When evaluating the plausibility of rival theories J and E, the use of datum d’s full intuitive force against E and for J is epistemically permissible only if (i) d is better explained by J than E and (ii) no intuitive components of d are equally well-explained by E. Finally, I conclude that the conjunction of pacifism and the Excuse View renders the intuitive defense of the Justification View largely moot, and that this is a substantial victory for pacifism. (shrink)

This article is about the distinction between justification and excuse, a distinction which, while familiar, remains controversial. My discussion focuses on three questions. First, what is the distinction? Second, why is it important? And third, what are some areas of inquiry in which the distinction might be philosophically fruitful? I suggest that the distinction has practical and theoretical consequences, and is therefore worth taking seriously; I highlight two philosophical issues in which the distinction might play a useful role; but I (...) express skepticism about the prospects for drawing a firm distinction between justification and excuse. (shrink)

The application of continuous deep sedation in the treatment of intractable suffering at the end of life continues to be tied to a number of concerns that have negated its use in palliative care. Part of the resistance towards use of this treatment option of last resort has been the continued association of CDS with physician-associated suicide and/or euthanasia, which is compounded by a lack clinical guidelines and a failure to cite this treatment under the aegis of a palliative care (...) approach. I argue that reinstituting a palliative care-inspired approach that includes a holistic review of the patient’s situation and the engagement of a multidisciplinary team guided by clearly defined practice requirements that have been lacking amongst many prevailing guidelines will overcome prevailing objections to this practice and allow for the legitimization of this process. (shrink)