A specific mapping mechanism is defined as the basic unit of “Biological Memory”. This mechanism must account for the characteristic frequency patterns in the organic world, where future probability is a function of past experience. The conditions for the function of biological memory are analysed. It is found that asymmetry, and irreversibility as a consequence of complexity, are the basic principles of memory function. The essential asymmetries in genetic memory are pointed out, and the problem of bilateral symmetry in a (...) basically asymmetrical organization is briefly outlined.Complexity is defined in terms of symmetry. The thermodynamic arrow of time and the biological arrow of time are discussed in relation to elementarity and complexity with their specific types of repeatabilities: non-accumulative in the first case and accumulative as a result of “copy-reproduction” by memory in the second case. The application of terminology from Information Theory and Thermodynamics to Memory Mechanics is critically considered.The immediate and inevitable consequences of memory function are shown to be irreversible expansion and irreversible, unpredictable diversification, leading to growing complexity and size on all but the sub-molecular levels of biological structure. (shrink)

This paper is aiming to investigate the physical substrate of conscious process. It will attempt to find out: How does conscious process establish relations between their external stimuli and internal stimuli in order to create reality? How does consciousness devoid of new sensory input result to its new quantum effects? And how does conscious process gain mass in brain? This paper will also try to locate the origins of consciousness at the level of neurons along with the quantum effects of (...) conscious process. (shrink)

Research into two-stage models of “free will” – first “free” random generation of alternative possibilities, followed by “willed” adequately determined decisions consistent with character, values, and desires – suggests that William James was in 1884 the first of a dozen philosophers and scientists to propose such a two-stage model for free will. We review the later work to establish James’s priority. By limiting chance to the generation of alternative possibilities, James was the first to overcome the standard two-part argument against (...) free will, i.e., that the will is either determined or random. James gave it elements of both, to establish freedom but preserve responsibility. We show that James was influenced by Darwin’s model of natural selection, as were most recent thinkers with a two-stage model. In view of James’s famous decision to make his first act of freedom a choice to believe that his will is free, it is most fitting to celebrate James’s priority in the free will debates by naming the two-stage model – first chance, then choice -“Jamesian” free will. (shrink)

Relationalism claims that the phenomenal character of perception is constituted by the obtaining of a non-representational psychological relation to mind-independent objects. Although relationalism provides what seems to be the most straightforward and intuitive account of how experience strikes us introspectively, it is very often believed that the argument from hallucination shows that the view is untenable. The aim of this thesis is to defend relationalism against the argument from hallucination. The argument claims that the phenomenal character of hallucination and perception (...) deserves the same account, and that relationalism cannot be true for hallucinations, therefore relationalism must be rejected. This argument relies on the Indiscriminability Principle, the claim that two experiences that are introspectively indiscriminable from each other have the same phenomenal character. Before assessing the plausibility of this principle, I first consider and dismiss versions of the argument which wouldn’t depend on IND. Although widely accepted, no satisfactory support for IND has been presented yet. In this thesis I argue that defending IND requires that we understand the notion of ‘indiscriminability’ employed in IND in an impersonal sense. I then identify what underwrites IND: the intuition that, in virtue of its superficiality, the nature of a phenomenal character must be accessible through introspection, together with the claim that it is not possible to deny IND without denying the superficiality of phenomenal characters too. I argue that the relationalist can deny IND while preserving the superficiality of phenomenal characters. This can be done by adopting a negative view of hallucination and an account of introspection whereby the phenomenal character doesn’t exist independently of one’s introspective awareness of it and where having introspective access to our experience depends on our perceptual access to the world. (shrink)

Normal 0 21 false false false MicrosoftInternetExplorer4 /* Style Definitions */ table.MsoNormalTable {mso-style-name:"Tabela normal"; mso-tstyle-rowband-size:0; mso-tstyle-colband-size:0; mso-style-noshow:yes; mso-style-parent:""; mso-padding-alt:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt; mso-para-margin:0cm; mso-para-margin-bottom:.0001pt; mso-pagination:widow-orphan; font-size:10.0pt; font-family:"Times New Roman"; mso-ansi-language:#0400; mso-fareast-language:#0400; mso-bidi-language:#0400;} O presente escrito aborda a relaçáo entre subjetividade e objetividade, mais precisamente trata da constituiçáo e configuraçáo da subjetividade na concepçáo do racionalismo crítico de Karl Popper. Considerando que para os fins deste texto os termos “eu” e “sujeito” sáo usados como sinônimos, o título do presente artigo poderia (...) ser: “O que o sujeito pensa que está fazendo no cosmos?”; “O ‘eu’ pensa que por ser autocriado é Deus?”; “Pode objetivamente uma máquina ser insubstituível?” Ou ainda: “O fantasma emerge no mundo”; Todas essas possibilidades têm em comum a indicaçáo direta ou metafórica da interdependência entre o “eu” (o sujeito, o fantasma, a personalidade), o cérebro (máquina, corpo) e o pensamento objetivo (resultado da interaçáo entre o “eu” e o cérebro). Qualquer das possibilidades acima evita as variáveis à pergunta que tradicionalmente foi feita: o que é o “eu”? Este tipo de questáo normalmente conduz a respostas essencialistas, infrutíferas e que redundam em verbalismos e equívocos. (shrink)