It is shown that the postulation of a minimum length for the horizons of a black hole leads to lower bounds for the electric charges and magnetic moments of elementary particles. If the minimum length has the order of the Planck scale, these bounds are given, respectively, by the electronic charge and by \. The latter implies that the masses of fundamental particles are bounded above by the Planck mass, and that the smallest non-zero neutrino mass is \eV. A precise (...) estimation in agreement to the area quantisation of Loop Quantum Gravity predicts a mass for the lightest massive state in concordance with flavor oscillation measurements, and a Barbero–Immirzi parameter in accordance to horizon entropy estimations. (shrink)

It seems natural to ask why the universe exists at all. Modern physics suggests that the universe can exist all by itself as a self-contained system, without anything external to create or sustain it. But there might not be an absolute answer to why it exists. I argue that any attempt to account for the existence of something rather than nothing must ultimately bottom out in a set of brute facts; the universe simply is, without ultimate cause or explanation.

It is argued that important information on the emergence of space is hidden at the quark/hadron level. The arguments follow from the acceptance of the conception that space is an attribute of matter. They involve in particular the discussion of possibly relevant mass and distance scales, the generalization of the concept of mass as suggested by the phase-space-based explanation of the rishon model, and the phenomenological conclusions on the structure of excited baryons that are implied by baryon spectroscopy. A counterpart (...) of the Eddington–Weinberg relation concerning Regge towers of hadronic resonances is noted. (shrink)

Current analytic metaphysics has been claimed to be, at best, out of touch with modern physics, at worst, actually in conflict with the latter The continuum companion to the philosophy of science, Continuum, London, 2011; Ladyman and Ross Every thing must go: metaphysics naturalized, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2007). While agreeing with some of these claims, it has been suggested that metaphysics may still be of service by providing a kind of ‘toolbox’ of devices that philosophers of science can access (...) in order to help provide an interpretation of theories in fundamental physics Metaphysics in contemporary physics, Rodopi, Amsterdam, 2015). In this context it has been argued that ‘standard’ forms of dispositionalism simply cannot be sustained in the context of modern physics but that certain ‘non-standard’ views may provide the resources to help explicate the sense in which physics may be regarded as ‘modally informed’. Here that suggestion will be further extended in order to consider the implications both with regard to the overall relevance of metaphysics given advances in science and for the prospects of a naturalised metaphysics more generally. In particular, this paper will focus on three concerns: that the particular tools identified are not, in fact, ‘scientifically disinterested’ and thus that the distinction between ‘naturalised’ and ‘non-naturalised’ metaphysics is at best vague or poorly drawn; that the usefulness of such tools depends on their being shaped to fit the relevant physics and thus the latter ‘guts’ metaphysics; that if metaphysics does prove to be useful in this sense then we have no reason to scorn non-naturalised metaphysics to begin with. (shrink)

Through an exploration of theoretical physics, this paper suggests the need for regrounding natural science in phenomenological philosophy. To begin, the philosophical roots of the prevailing scientific paradigm are traced to the thinking of Plato, Descartes, and Newton. The crisis in modern science is then investigated, tracking developments in physics, science's premier discipline. Einsteinian special relativity is interpreted as a response to the threat of discontinuity implied by the Michelson-Morley experiment, a challenge to classical objectivism that Einstein sought to counteract. (...) We see that Einstein's efforts to banish discontinuity ultimately fall into the “black hole” predicted in his general theory of relativity. The unavoidable discontinuity that haunts Einstein's theory is also central to quantum mechanics. Here too the attempt has been made to manage discontinuity, only to have this strategy thwarted in the end by the intractable problem of quantum gravity. The irrepressible discontinuity manifested in the phenomena of modern physics proves to be linked to a merging of subject and object that flies in the face of Cartesian philosophy. To accommodate these radically non-classical phenomena, a new philosophical foundation is called for: phenomenology. Phenomenological philosophy is elaborated through Merleau-Ponty's concept of depth and is then brought into focus for use in theoretical physics via qualitative work with topology and hypercomplex numbers. In the final part of this paper, a detailed summary is offered of the specific application of topological phenomenology to quantum gravity that was systematically articulated in The Self-Evolving Cosmos (Rosen 2008a). (shrink)

We examine the notions of negative, infinite and hotter than infinite temperatures and show how these unusual concepts gain legitimacy in quantum statistical mechanics. We ask if the existence of an infinite temperature implies the existence of an actual infinity and argue that it does not. Since one can sensibly talk about hotter than infinite temperatures, we ask if one could legitimately speak of other physical quantities, such as length and duration, in analogous terms. That is, could there be longer (...) than infinite lengths or temporal durations? We argue that the answer is surprisingly yes, and we outline the properties of a number system that could be employed to characterize such magnitudes. (shrink)

In Minkowski spacetime, because of the relativity of simultaneity to the inertial frame chosen, there is no unique world-at-an-instant. Thus the classical view that there is a unique set of events existing now in a three dimensional space cannot be sustained. The two solutions most often advanced are that the four-dimensional structure of events and processes is alone real, and that becoming present is not an objective part of reality; and that present existence is not an absolute notion, but is (...) relative to inertial frame; the world-at-an-instant is a three dimensional, but relative, reality. According to a third view, advanced by Robb, Capek and Stein, what is present at a given spacetime point is, strictly speaking, constituted by that point alone. I argue here against the first of these views that the four-dimensional universe cannot be said to exist now, already, or indeed at any time at all; so that talk of its existence or reality as if that precludes the existence or reality of the present is a non sequitur. The second view assumes that in relativistic physics time lapse is measured by the time co-ordinate function; against this I maintain that it is in fact measured by the proper time, as I argue by reference to the Twin Paradox. The third view, although formally correct, is tarnished by its unrealistic assumption of point-events. This makes it susceptible to paradox, and also sets it at variance with our normal intuitions of the present. I argue that a defensible concept of the present is nonetheless obtainable when account is taken of the non-instantaneity of events, including that of conscious awareness, as that region of spacetime comprised between the forward lightcone of the beginning of a small interval of proper time t and the backward lightcone of the end of that interval. This gives a serviceable notion of what is present to a given event of short duration, as well as saving our intuition of the “reality” or robustness of present events. (shrink)

Recent developments in the scientific realism debate have resulted in a form of ‘exemplar driven’ realism that eschews general ‘recipes’ and instead focuses on the specific, ‘local’ reasons for adopting a realist stance in particular theoretical contexts. Here I suggest that such a move highlights even more sharply the need for the realist to incorporate a health dose of metaphysics in her position, particularly when it comes to the theories associated with modern physics. Turning to another set of recent developments, (...) having to do with the relationship between metaphysics and science, I argue that the exemplar driven realist can appropriate certain current metaphysical devices to help make concrete her commitments. Specifically I focus on a kind of exemplar based structural realism and examine the adequacy of, first, the determinables-determinate relationship as presented by Wilson and, second, Paul’s ‘one category ontology, as such devices within this framework. (shrink)

This paper reviews the algebra of Eddington'sE numbers and identifies those points where Eddington anticipated results of current interest. He discovered the Majorana spinors, and was responsible for the standard γ 5 notation as well as the notion of chirality. Furthermore, Eddington defined Clifford algebras in eight and nine dimensions which are now appearing in grand unified gauge and supersymmetric theories. A point which Eddington cleared up, yet is still misunderstood, is that the Dirac algebra corresponds to afive-dimensional base space.

The fundamental open questions of general relativity theory are the unification of the gravitational field with other fields, aiming at a unified geometrization of physics, as well as the renormalization of relativistic gravitational theory in order to obtain their self-consistent solutions. These solutions are to furnish field-theoretic particle models—a problem first discussed by Einstein. In addition, we are confronted with the issue of a coupling between gravitational and matter fields determined (not only) by Einstein's principle of equivalence, and also with (...) the question of the geometric meaning of a gravitational quantum theory. In our view, all these problems are so closely related that they warrant a general solution. We treat mainly the concepts suggested by Einstein and Weyl. (shrink)

In this paper I focus on the impact on structuralism of the quantum treatment of objects in terms of symmetry groups and, in particular, on the question as to how we might eliminate, or better, reconceptualise such objects in structural terms. With regard to the former, both Cassirer and Eddington not only explicitly and famously tied their structuralism to the development of group theory but also drew on the quantum treatment in order to further their structuralist aims and here I (...) sketch the relevant history with an eye on what lessons might be drawn. With regard to the latter, Ladyman has explicitly cited Castellani's work on the group-theoretical constitution of quantum objects and I indicate both how such an approach needs to be understood if it is to mesh with Ladyman's 'ontic' form of structural realism and how it might accommodate permutation symmetry through a consideration of Huggett's recent account. (shrink)

A survey is presented of the essential principles for formulating relativistic wave equations in curved spacetime. The approach is relatively simple and avoids much of the philosophical debate about covariance principles, which is also indicated. Hypercomplex numbers provide a natural language for covariance symmetry and the two important kinds of covariant derivative.

A clarification of the heuristic concept of decoherence requires a consistent description of the classical behavior of some quantum systems. We adopt algebraic quantum mechanics since it includes not only classical physics, but also permits a judicious concept of a classical mixture and explains the possibility of the emergence of a classical behavior of quantum systems. A nonpure quantum state can be interpreted as a classical mixture if and only if its components are disjoint. Here, two pure quantum states are (...) called disjoint if there exists an element of the center of the algebra of observables such that its expectation values with respect to these states are different. An appropriate automorphic dynamics can transform a factor state into a classical mixture of asymptotically disjoint final states. Such asymptotically disjoint quantum states lead to regular decision problems while exactly disjoint states evoke singular problems which engineers reject as improperly posed. (shrink)

Products of particlelike representations of the homogeneous Lorentz group are used to construct the degrees of spin angular momentum of a composite system of protons and neutrons. If a canonical labeling system is adopted for each state, a shell structure emerges. Furthermore the use of the Dirac ring ensures that the spin is characterized by half-angles in accord with the neutron-rotation experiment. It is possible to construct a Clebsch-Gordan decomposition to reduce a state of complex angular momentum into simpler states (...) which can be identified with α and β particles, multipole operators, etc. Finally, ground-state energy levels are calculated for all the even-even nuclei by using a differentiable manifold that is spin-graded and gauge-invariant by construction. It is shown that this manifold is Grassmann. (shrink)