This paper was originally presented as part of a panel entitled "Feminist Philosophy After Twenty Years" at the 1993 meeting of the Eastern Division of the American Philosophical Association (APA). It is a discussion of the conditions that needed to be-and were-present in the United States in the 1970s in order for feminist philosophy to take root and flourish.

On the standard view, pessimism is a philosophically intractable topic. Against the standard view, I hold that pessimism is a stance, or compound of attitudes, commitments and intentions. This stance is marked by certain beliefs—first and foremost, that the bad prevails over the good—which are subject to an important qualifying condition: they are always about outcomes and states of affairs in which one is personally invested. This serves to distinguish pessimism from other views with which it is routinely conflated— including (...) skepticism and nihilism—and to allow for the extent to which pessimism necessarily involves more than the intellectual endorsement of a doctrine. (shrink)

In this book, the words ‘science’ and ‘social science’ are used in their limited sense that refer to experience-based knowledge. This should not indicate that experience is being used in a positivistic sense. Rather, the important insights of all kinds of post-positivist views are embraced to give an extensive meaning to experience. However, the most important characteristic of experience and science that should never be excluded is its dependence on observation and observational evidence. Thus, when ‘science’ is used in combination (...) with ‘religion’, it should not be confused by religious knowledge. The latter might refer to, perhaps, a certain kind of knowledge that could be found in religious texts and might be different from other kinds of knowledge. However, when the phrase of ‘religious science’ is used, it refers to a scientific knowledge, even though because of its religious presuppositions it is called religious. And this relation between religion and science is exactly the point that is at issue in this book. On one hand, the issue of religious science raises challenges on the ground that the contemporary science has been explicitly non-religious or perhaps in some cases anti-religious. Objectivity of science is usually understood in a way that it does not permit to combine ‘science’ with ‘religion’. Thus, in the first step, the phrase of religious science is considered as nonsense. On the other hand, as far as religious people are concerned, the issue of religious science is enthusiastic. These people sometimes think that a real religion should include all scientific truths. Thus, facing the issue, they immediately verdict that there are or should be religious sciences. However, neither that strong challenge with the possibility of any religious science, nor this hot enthusiasm could be in congruence with the spirit of scientific endeavor. As far as social scientists are concerned, the possibility of religious science should not be rejected a priori. This possibility should not be necessarily considered as a threat for science, rather the plausibility of its being a chance for the development of science should also be taken into account. On the other hand, as far as the religious people are concerned, they should not necessarily consider the possibility of talking about religious sciences as a chance for spreading their religion, rather the plausibility of its being a threat for their purpose should also be considered. This is because entering of a religion into a job which is not relevant to it could be dangerous. Far from these two kinds of biases, it is attempted in this book to deal with the issue in a reflective manner. It seems that thinking about ‘religious science’ requires us to take three steps. In the first step, we need to think about the nature or characteristics of science. In the second step, we need to think about the nature or characteristics of religion. And finally, in the third step, it seem necessary to think about the combination of them. These three steps show the direction of the discussion in what follows. (shrink)

In this paper, I discuss the current thesis on the modern origin of the ad hominem-argument, by analysing the Aristotelian conception of it. In view of the recent accounts which consider it a relative argument, i.e., acceptable only by the particular respondent, I maintain that there are two Aristotelian versions of the ad hominem, that have identifiable characteristics, and both correspond to the standard variants distinguished in the contemporary treatments of the famous informal fallacy: the abusive and the circumstancial or (...) tu quoque types. I propose to reconstruct the two Aristotelian versions (see sections 1 and 2), which have been recognized again in the ninteenth century (sec. 3). Finally, I examine whether or not it was considered as a fallacious dialogue device by Aristotle and by A. Schopenhauer (sec. 4). (shrink)

This paper is a sequel to my 'Theological Misinterpretations of Current Physical Cosmology' (Foundations of Physics [1996], 26 (4); revised in Philo [1998], 1 (1)). There I argued that the Big Bang models of (classical) general relativity theory, as well as the original 1948 versions of the steady state cosmology, are each logically incompatible with the time-honored theological doctrine that perpetual divine creation ('creatio continuans') is required in each of these two theorized worlds. Furthermore, I challenged the perennial theological doctrine (...) that there must be a divine creative cause (as distinct from a transformative one) for the very existence of the world, a ratio essendi. This doctrine is the theistic reply to the question: 'Why is there something, rather than just nothing?' I begin my present paper by arguing against the response by the contemporary Oxford theist Richard Swinburne and by Leibniz to what is, in effect, my counter-question: 'But why should there be just nothing, rather than something?' Their response takes the form of claiming that the a priori probability of there being just nothing, vis-à-vis the existence of alternative states, is maximal, because the non-existence of the world is conceptually the simplest. On the basis of an analysis of the role of simplicity in scientific explanations, I show that this response is multiply flawed, and thus provides no basis for their three contentions that (i) if there is a world at all, then its 'normal', natural, spontaneous state is one of utter nothingness or total non-existence, so that (ii) the very existence of matter, energy and living beings constitutes a deviation from the allegedly 'normal', spontaneous state of 'nothingness', and (iii) that deviation must thus have a suitably potent (external) divine cause. Related defects turn out to vitiate the medieval Kalam Argument for the existence of God, as espoused by William Craig. Next I argue against the contention by such theists as Richard Swinburne and Philip L. Quinn that (i) the specific content of the scientifically most fundamental laws of nature, including the constants they contain, requires supra-scientific explanation, and (ii) a satisfactory explanation is provided by the hypothesis that the God of theism willed them to be exactly what they are. Furthermore, I contend that the theistic teleological gloss on the 'Anthropic Principle' is incoherent and explanatorily unavailing. Finally, I offer an array of considerations against Swinburne's attempt to show, via Bayes's theorem, that the existence of God is more probable than not. (shrink)

Mill was receptive to all sorts of ideas, both plausible and implausible, which did not fit well with utilitarianism. He was, for example, inclined to think of equality, not just pleasure, as. He was able to think of himself as a utilitarian only by grossly expanding that notion to cover any doctrine which did not entirely rely, without the possibility of further explanation, on or God's commands. It is even doubtful whether he was a consequentialist in any sense. Mill's account (...) of moral obligation is not a maximizing, nor even a satisficing, one. And the account emphasizes the place of supererogation. There is no suggestion in Mill that one is obliged to do something merely because a teaching to that effect would be felicific. Far from there being an obligation to maximize, it would sometimes be wrong merely to make Pareto-improvements. Sympathetically understood, the account of obligation in Mill is more or less the same as one finds in Hobbes, with his theorems. (shrink)

[We understand by ‘person’] a thinking intelligent being, that has reason and reflection, and can consider itself, as itself, the same thinking thing, in different times and places….There has been a tendency among philosophers ever since Locke to conflate the problem of the self with the problem of personal identity, and since memory is clearly essential to a sense of one's identity through time, it is easy to suppose that having a concept of self requires memory too.

The version of the paradox of false judgement examined at Tht. 188c10–189b9 relies on the assumption that to judge falsehoods is to judge the things which are not. The presentation of the argument displays several syntactic ambiguities: at several points it allows the reader to adopt different syntactic connections between the components of sentences. For instance, when Socrates says that in a false judgement the cognizer is “he who judges the things which are not about anything whatsoever” (188d3–4), how should (...) the clause “about anything whatsoever” be construed? In common with “he who judges” and “the things which are not” (in which case the cognizer would be “he who judges about anything whatsoever the things which are not about it”), or exclusively with “he who judges” (in which case the cognizer would be “he who judges about anything whatsoever the things which are not”)? The most plausible answer is that both construals are envisaged. Accordingly, the argument has two branches corresponding to these two alternative construals. In particular, it attempts to show that in both cases the cognizer will address what does not exist – an impossibility. The idea that a false judgement is concerned with what is not about its reference has a clear echo in the Sophist. The way in which the problem is handled in the Theaetetus provides a hint that can help to find a solution for the hotly debated issue of the interpretation of the Sophist’s account of false statement. (shrink)

How best to introduce philosophical ideas? Is the best and only way by studying the history of philosophy and its rational arguments and discussions? But can literature, usually hived off from philosophy, be used instead and can this be as effective as rational argument? This paper explores these questions. First it considers a text which introduces philosophy through the analysis of literature, in particular James Joyce's 'Araby', arguing that the traditional analytic approach employed by the text, by concentrating on epistemology, (...) obscures other philosophical insights offered by Joyce. It then turns to French philosophy and literature and suggests that Sartre, Beauvoir and Camus by 'blurring' the analytic distinction between philosophy and literature have much to offer to the grasping and understanding of philosophical ideas and principles. (shrink)

This paper attempts to delve into Wittgenstein’s unique notion of solipsism and its centrality in his proposal of transcendental ethics. Ethics for him is an enquiry into what is most valuable in one’s life; a very personal experience of values woven around the individual subject. We analyse the true nature of ethical in Wittgenstein’s writings and argue that it can only be understood through a close examination of the relation he proposes between self and the world. Our argument is rooted (...) around his unique notion of solipsism without a solipsistic self. This distinctive ontological relationship between self and the world explicates moral significance into the world and how morality is defined as deeply felt personal responses to life. (shrink)

Sleep is consciousness naturally folded back to itself in the self-come-home-to-self, to find life nourished, renovated, and vitalized, all beyond objective management. Sleep can never be understood with direct conscious approach, but must be approached indirectly, implicatively, and alive coherently, as tried here. Sleep (A) is Spontaneity, (B) Self-Fullness, and so (C) sleep is life’s Gospel of Self-ing.

From 1990 on, the London psychologist Max Velmans developed a novel approach to consciousness according to which an experience of an object is phenomenologically identical to an object as experienced. On the face of it I agree; but unlike Velmans I argue that the latter should be understood as comparable, not to a Kantian, but rather to a noematic.

Once upon a time, there were no academic disciplines. There were no definitions, either, at least as we understand them. Plato and Aristotle changed both of those situations in ways that continue to influence Western thought. If Plato's and Xenophon's accounts are to be trusted, Socrates and Prodicus also deserve credit for early efforts to define words, thereby helping to formulate the classic Socratic/Platonic question "What is X?" And here we are, twenty-four hundred years later, still occasionally wrestling with how (...) to describe rhetoric, philosophy, and the relationship between the two.Drawing on my thirty-five years of thinking and writing about the classical and contemporary mediation of philosophy and... (shrink)

(2000). ROBERT LESLIE ELLIS AND JOHN STUART MILL ON THE ONE AND THE MANY OF FREQUENTISM. British Journal for the History of Philosophy: Vol. 8, No. 2, pp. 251-274.

It can be argued that we live in a golden age for the history of philosophy: more relevant historiographical works in the field are being published today than ever before. The present paper tries to explain this as an effect of the exponential quantitative and qualitative expansion of philosophy, its subdisciplines and its fields of research since at least the mid-twentieth century. It then explores some of the consequences of these current trends and the challenge they represent for any relevant (...) effort in history of philosophy today. (shrink)

This paper critiques enlightenment notions of representation and rehearses an alternative model of mapping that is grounded in performance. Working from her own practice as a landscape painter, Bolt argues that the particular experience of the “glare” of Australian light fractures the nexus between light, form, knowledge, and subjectivity. This rupture prompts a move from shedding light ON the matter to shedding light FOR the matter and suggests an emergent rather than a representational practice.

In the second chapter of Utilitarianism John Stuart Mill writes: It is quite compatible with the principle of utility to recognise the fact, that some kinds of pleasure are more desirable and more valuable than others. It would be absurd that while, in estimating all other things, quality is considered as well as quantity, the estimation of pleasures should be supposed to depend on quantity alone.

Résumé Cet article esquisse une généalogie du privilège que le terme concept a acquis en français par rapport à notion et à idée en se fondant non seulement sur les ouvrages des philosophes, mais sur des dictionnaires de langue philosophique. Il comprend quatre parties chronologiques. Après avoir étudié l’introduction des termes concept, notion, idée dans la langue philosophique, la première partie répertorie leurs usages dans les dictionnaires scolastiques du SVIIe siècle. La deuxième montre que Descartes a imposé idée en donnant (...) de ce terme une acception large et que les dictionnaires post-cartésiens la reprenne. La troisième établit que Kant a, contre cette acception large, introduit une distinction entre Begriff et Idee, mais que, initialement, les dictionnaires français refusèrent cette distinction. La quatrième et dernière partie est consacrée à un XXe siècle marqué par l’idéalisme allemand et l’analyse logique : aussi différentes qu’aient été ces deux traditions, elles ont été d’accord pour consacrer la prééminence du terme concept. (shrink)

Dismissing criticisms that Leonard Peikoff's book, The DIM Hypothesis, is unscientific, deterministic, or rationalistic, this essay focuses on problems with the logical framework of Peikoff's study of Western culture. In particular, Peikoff has conflated two different kinds of rationalists and empiricists and has completely overlooked combinations of the Platonist and so-called “Kantian” modes. As a result, his three pure integration “modes” actually produce not just two “mixtures” but a total of six. Furthermore, without absolving Kant of very serious philosophical errors, (...) the author marshals evidence that the real culprit responsible for the culturally disastrous “Disintegration” mode was one of Kant's predecessors. (shrink)

Religion is presented as a family of religions, identified by a cluster of religion-making features, most but not all of which must be present, involving beliefs and practices which are diverse and often in conflict. Because of differences in scope, application of scientific method, and vocabulary, science can also be regarded as a family—this time a family of sciences. The universality of the physical sciences contrasts with the more restricted scope of the earth sciences and the human sciences. Their relationship (...) can be shown by a three-tiered pyramid, with the physical sciences at the base, the human sciences at the top, and the earth sciences in the middle. Despite three notable differences between science and religion, science and religion are not, as popularly believed, in conflict. The contrary view, espoused by the “new atheists,” is shown to be based on oversimplified views of religion and science. There are nontheistic religions and science is committed, not to metaphysical naturalism (“scientism”), but only to methodological naturalism. Stephen Jay Gould escapes the conflict view by proposing that science and religion are independent “magisteria”, science being occupied with facts and religion with values. In divorcing the realm of facts from the realm of values, he too distorts their complex nature, for science is not devoid of values and religion makes claims about the facts. As Hume long ago suggested, facts and values are interconnected. While a fact is not the same as a value, a fact cannot support a value without presupposing another value in turn. Interaction between facts and values is here to stay. (shrink)

Muddles can be instructive. The clarifying confusion to be examined in this paper is Isaiah Berlin's intelligent vacillation on the issue of whether or not the extent of a person's freedom depends on his desires. Is the amount of freedom an agent possesses determined solely by his objective circumstances or is it also partly a function of his subjective tastes and preferences? In clarifying this question I shall suggest that Berlin has trouble answering it because he almost perceives that interpersonal (...) cardinal measurement of freedom, if possible at all, is possible only on a subjective basis. Yet as Berlin eloquently reminds us measuring freedom according to a subjective metric generates paradox. Whether commonsense ideas of freedom are consistent and reasonable is not purely an academic issue, for we do often make political judgments to the effect that one or another policy, or a movement to one or another form of society, can be expected to reduce or enlarge human freedom. If freedom is not measurable these judgments are merely hortatory. (shrink)

ABSTRACT:Analytic philosophers have criticized A. N. Whitehead's metaphysics for being obscure, yet several such philosophers have espoused positions in metaphysics and philosophy of mind that were advanced by Whitehead in the 1920s. In this paper, we evaluate the merits and demerits of these criticisms by Bertrand Russell, W. V. Quine, Karl Popper, and others and then demonstrate the affinities and contrasts in the positions advanced by Galen Strawson, David Chalmers, Thomas Nagel, and Whitehead regarding so-called ‘analytic panexperientialism’.

Many writers, both scientists and philosophers, when discussing the mind‐body problem, adopt what might be called the physicalist principle of the closedness of the physical world. They reject the possibility that the physical world is causally open to a realm of conscious experience that is not part of it.Among the upholders of such a view are those who may be called radical materialists or radical physicalists, who deny that there exists a realm of conscious experience. Also, there are the proponents (...) of various identity theories, who admit that there is such a realm, but claim that it may be in some sense identified with parts of the physical world.There are, however, other writers who accept the physicalist principle, but who nevertheless also accept that there exists a genuinely autonomous realm of conscious experience. Such writers often hold some form of panpsychism or epiphenomenalism, and in what follows these two views are briefly explained and critically discussed. (shrink)

From 1980 until 1985, the Dutch Faculties of Philosophy went through a period of transition. First, in 1982 the national government introduced a new system of financing research at the universities. This was essentially based on the natural sciences and did not match philosophers' work organization. In 1983 a drastic reduction in the budget for philosophy was proposed within the framework of a policy of introducing savings by distributing tasks among the universities. Recently, a visiting committee reported on the weak (...) and strong areas of Dutch philosophy and proposed a policy to strengthen Dutch philosophy. This study explores the effects of the institutional reorganizations on the study of philosophy at the faculties, using scientometric methods. In addition to presenting empirical results, some methodological questions concerning the application of scientometric methods to a field of the humanities will be discussed. The number of publications went up as funding was cut back and different subfields made different kinds of changes in orientation. The results show the relevance of publication-based data in research evaluation. (shrink)

The work has two parts. The first part is about Peirce and his ideas about the continuum. There are considered the connection of his theory of continuity with his loic and his philosophy. In the second part Peirce's ideas are compared with models of todays logic and mathematics. There is considerd constructive mathematics, the logic of perception from Bell, Blau's Logic of reflection and a model of Myrvold. Then there is developed a new model.