To explain how social cognition normally serves us in real life, we need to ask which factors contribute to specific social interactions. Recent accounts, and mostly pluralistic models, have started incorporating contextual and social factors in explanations of social cognition. In this paper, I further motivate the importance of contextual and identity factors for social cognition. This paper presents scripts as an alternative resource in social cognition that can account for contextual and identity factors. Scripts are normative and context-sensitive knowledge (...) structures that describe behavior in terms of corresponding events, situations, social roles, individuals, or mental state types in a way that guides action. The script approach presented here builds on recent accounts of social cognition but points out important differences and possible advantages it has over them: for example, the script approach focuses even more strongly on context and identity. (shrink)

To explain how social cognition normally serves us in real life, we need to ask which factors contribute to specific social interactions. Recent accounts, and mostly pluralistic models, have started incorporating contextual and social factors in explanations of social cognition. In this paper, I further motivate the importance of contextual and identity factors for social cognition. This paper presents scripts as an alternative resource in social cognition that can account for contextual and identity factors. Scripts are normative and context-sensitive knowledge (...) structures that describe behavior in terms of corresponding events, situations, social roles, individuals, or mental state types in a way that guides action. The script approach presented here builds on recent accounts of social cognition but points out important differences and possible advantages it has over them: e.g., the script approach focuses even more strongly on context and identity. (shrink)

In recent years, an array of critical emotion theorists have emerged who call for change with respect to how emotion theory is done, how emotions are understood, and how we do emotion. In this chapter, I draw on the work that some of these authors have produced to analyze how emotional marginalization of trans and disabled identities is experienced, considering in particular how this emotional marginalization results from the long history of pathologization of trans and disabled people. The past and (...) current pathologization of trans and disabled people is produced through normative assumptions, values, and beliefs that uphold systems of normalcy, including assumptions, values, and beliefs about how we feel and express emotions. In order to examine these issues, I identify three different stages at which emotional marginalization may take place: emotion experience, emotional display, and emotion recognition. In other words, emotional marginalization of trans and disabled people can occur at any of these stages. The central concern of my chapter is thus to show how emotional marginalization, at each of these stages, affects trans and disabled people. (shrink)

Over the past decade, the notion of affective affordances has gained some prominence, particularly in the context of 4E approaches to affectivity. One example of affective affordances, mostly mentioned in passing in 4E approaches to affectivity, are atmospheres. Notoriously difficult to pin down in general, it has so far also remained unclear what distinguishes atmospheres from other affective affordances and whether they are a distinctive type of solicitations. Intuitively, the atmosphere of a situation implies an affect-regulatory profile different to what (...) and how single objects solicit. Notably, as affective frames of sociocultural delineated situations they are relevant for coordinating social interactions and modulate personal concerns pertaining to a given situation. In accordance with paradigm cases of experiencing atmospheres, I will claim that they make salient how one is affectively disposed toward situation-specific feeling norms. I will clarify this claim by drawing on the concepts of social and emotion scripts as they have been developed in cognitive psychology and psychology of emotions. Atmospheres will thus be understood as solicitations to change situational emotion scripts. In this way, they represent a distinct avenue for changing fields of affordances over time, based on personal concerns for social and cultural belonging. Conversely, this account sheds light on the affective underpinnings of the perception of social norms. (shrink)

Constructivist theories of emotions and empirical studies have been increasingly stressing the role of contextual information and cultural conventions in emotion recognition. We propose a new account of emotion recognition and attribution that systematically integrates these aspects, and argue that emotion recognition is part of the general process of person impression formation. To describe the structural organization and the role of background information in emotion recognition and attribution, we introduce situation models and personal models. These models constitute the top-level structures (...) in a complex hierarchy of dimensions which considers different types of basic emotion cues. Thus, we propose a multidimensional account of emotion recognition which enables us to integrate the top-down and bottom-up processes involved: basic emotion cues in certain contexts can trigger situation models and person models, which influence emotion recognition which, in turn, reinforce or modify these models. We argue that this kind of loop deeply affects the way emotions enter our social interactions. Our account is in line with the “normative turn” of social cognition, that stresses the way social expectations actively shape the patterns we recognize, and make, in our social world. (shrink)