Many political theorists have turned to the dramatic political events of the post-9/11 world – terrorism, war, and the erosion of civil liberties – for insight into our changing sense of the political. Yet few have examined the economic dimensions of these events or sought to learn what they might tell us about the changing nature of political community today. This article seeks to fill this gap by drawing on the work of Michel Foucault and Georgio Agamben to examine the (...) intimate and changing relationship between the political and the economic in the contemporary world. Now more than ever, there is a particular conception of politics at stake in global efforts to govern economic relations. Global economic institutions like the IMF and World Bank are policing the definition of political community and, in doing so, extending the scope of liberal governmentality. At the same time, the character of their implementation and justification is that of the sovereign exception, as state autonomy must continually be breached through extensive conditionality in order for it to be re-established in the form of a more ‘sound’ political and economic order. This is a sovereign exception with a difference: for the norm that is being established is one that necessarily limits the scope of sovereign power in the interests of market freedom. Paradoxically, while the economy is often the exception to politics as usual, is it an exception that simultaneously enables and constrains the possibility of exercising sovereignty itself? (shrink)

This article argues that capital flight of real investment presents governments with a quadrilemma. First, governments can tailor their policies to attract investors – but this is incompatible with a whole range of alternative policy choices. Second, they can simply accept capital flight – but this is incompatible with a robust capital stock and tax base. Third, they can harmonize its taxes and regulations with other states – but this is incompatible with international independence. Fourth, they can impose capital controls (...) – but this is incompatible with international capital mobility. These incompatibilities make up four different goals, the value of which are described. Strategies may be mixed, but the pursuit of any three goals must always come at the expense of the fourth. (shrink)

In this paper the co-responsibility of the North for the development of the South, the chance of an authentic developmentand Rawls’s maximin rule are indicated as the ethical perspectives from which the financial integration of developing countries will beevaluated. It follows a brief economic analysis of possible problems of high inflows of portfolio investments for developing countries. They become more vulnerable to financial and monetary crises and their domestic banking systems are weakened by a higher risk of devaluation. This will (...) lead to an outline of the goals for reshaping the financial integration: among others limitation of capital inflows,strengthening of the domestic banking system and further development of the country’s particular economic style. Finally someregulations of external financial relations and the proposal of a cooperative monetary arrangement between the South and the Northare discussed as possible measures to improve this integration. (shrink)