Using both Confucian texts and the work of American pragmatist John Dewey, this book offers a distinctly Confucian model of democracy.

This article argues that people have legitimate interests in privacy that deserve legal protection on democratic principles. It describes the right to privacy as a bundle of rights of personal choice, association and expression and shows that, so described, people have legitimate political interests in privacy. These interests reflect the ways that privacy rights can supplement the protection for people's freedom and equality provided by rights of political choice, association and expression, and can help to make sure that these are, (...) genuinely, democratic. Feminists have often been ambivalent about legal protection for privacy, because privacy rights have, so often, protected the coercion and exploitation of women, and made it difficult to politicise personal forms of injustice. However, attention to the differences between democratic and undemocratic forms of politics can enable us to meet these concerns, and to distinguish a democratic justification of privacy rights from the alternatives. (shrink)

If it is mastery itself which is undergoing deconstruction and if the modern tradition of painting is conventionally recuperated as a tradition of masters, then feminist practice has not surprisingly tended towards the exploration and celebration of its difference(s) at the margins of painting … And yet in this very deconstructive exploration, this celebration of difference, feminist practice reinscribes itself within Tradition and as fundamental to postmodernity. (Phillipson, 1985:188).

The systematic philosophical foundation for Jean-François Lyotard's postmodern and post-Marxist politics is described. The central principle of the right to create different "phrases" is uncovered and examined. The political consequences of this philosophical system are explored, leading to the conclusion that Lyotard's commitment to difference leads to political indifference. The philosophical roots of this indifference are detailed in Lyotard's Cartesian starting point and his analysis of Holocaust revisionism. This analysis reveals an idealist basis to Lyotard's philosophy of difference. Lyotard's concept (...) of difference is compared to that of Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe. (shrink)

As radical feminists seeking to overcome the linguistic oppression of women, Rich and Daly apparently shared the same agenda in the late 1970s; but they approached the problem differently, and their paths have increasingly diverged. Whereas Daly's approach to the repossession of language is code-oriented and totalizing, Rich's approach is open-ended and context-oriented. Rich has therefore addressed more successfully than Daly the problem of language in use.

An anonymous vigilante attack by six women on an Auckland University lecturer in 1984 took place in the context of ongoing feminist reframing of rape and sexual abuse. Most feminists’ responses to this incident assumed the man's guilt and uncritically accepted the allegations made against him. This was not surprising in view of the prescriptive radical feminist hegemony that prevailed in New Zealand throughout the late 1970s and 1980s. Recent feminist writings on sexual harassment have been more ready to grapple (...) with the complexities and ambiguities of issues of sexuality and pedagogy – a shift that enables women to have a wider range of responses to unwanted sexual attention. Some of the earlier and problematic radical feminist notions about rape and sexual abuse have been absorbed into the treatment discourse, with some distressing consequences. In 1988 an over-zealous Christchurch doctor believed she had detected signs of sexual abuse in fifty-six children at a health camp. Her intervention resulted in some girls being removed from their families, even though they denied they had ever been abused. One New Zealand doctor, a pioneer in sexual abuse work in this country, has published a book documenting developments in this area, and expressing grave misgivings about over-intervention and false allegations of abuse. There are persistent attempts to discredit her concerns. However, there is a groundswell of public disquiet over some aspects of sexual abuse work, which cannot be dismissed as backlash. (shrink)

The last decade has seen the emergence of a feminist awareness of old age and, in particular, a growing awareness of what has come to be seen as “the problem of old women.” Old women, it has been consistently demonstrated, are disadvantaged in a variety of ways in relation to old men. They are poorer, older, and sicker; they have less adequate housing and less access to private transport; they are more likely to experience widowhood, severe disability, and institutionalization. Taking (...) “the problem of old women” as its starting point, this article argues for a less phallocentric analysis of women in old age, which is less reliant on men as a relational category to define the conditions, experiences, and resources of older women. (shrink)

The following article is an exploration of the non-linear and non-unified identities that make up Australian feminism. The main premise is that the divergent strands of rational and romantic thought, central to the project of liberalism, are inherent in the characterization of Australian feminisms. As a result, there have always been tensions between feminists, centred around politics of self-identification. These tensions continue to exist, but to be articulated in different ways in different decades as a result of the ever changing (...) relationships between feminist, state and media/public discourses. These ideas are explored through comparing two key moments in our recent past in which differences between feminisms were declared. These two events – the Mary Daly visit to Australia to promote Gyn/ecology in 1981, and the debate engendered by Helen Garner's The First Stone in 1995 – are taken to be performative metaphors through which the continuities and discontinuities of the nature of Australian feminisms can be subjectively explored. (shrink)

This paper proposes that in developing jurisprudence on women’s rights, the African Commission will need to ask the woman question, particularly the African woman question. The woman question requires a judicial or quasi-judicial body to always put woman at the centre of any decision with a view to addressing the historically disadvantaged position of women in society. Asking the African woman question means examining how the peculiar experiences of African women have been ignored by laws rooted in patriarchy across the (...) region. Although the Commission has handled few cases directly dealing with women’s rights, the paper suggests that the Commission can draw inspiration from decisions of other regional and international human rights bodies such as the European Court on Human Rights and the Committee on Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women on how to ask the woman question. The paper recommends that in line with feminist reasoning, there is a need for the African Commission to develop a consistent gender-sensitive approach in dealing with cases that may have implications for women. In essence, the African Commission must ask the African woman question when dealing with cases on the enjoyment of women’s fundamental rights. (shrink)

Accounts of mothering have both contributed to feminist theory's development and depended on certain of its central concepts. Some of its critics, however, argue that feminist theory is undermined by the problems of exclusion and essentialism. Here I distinguish between these two problems and consider their implications for questions about mothering. I conclude that exclusion and essentialism do not present insurmountable obstacles to theorizing motherhood, but do suggest new directions for such theorizing.

The “social contract” becomes part of the lived experience of little boys when they discover that the school forbids the warrior narratives through which they initially define masculinity and imposes a different, public sphere; masculinity of rationality and responsibility. They learn that these narratives are not to be lived but only experienced symbolically through fantasy and sport in the private sphere of desire. Little girls, whose gender-defining fantasies are not repressed by the school, have less lived awareness of the social (...) contract. (shrink)

The impact of feminism on men has produced both backlash and attempts to reconstruct masculinity. The Australian environmental movement, strongly influenced by countercultural ideas, is a case in which feminist pressure has produced significant attempts at change among men. These are explored through life-history interviews founded on a practice-based theory of gender. Six life histories are traced through three dialectical moments: engagement with hegemonic masculinity; separation focused on an individualized remaking of the self, involving an attempt to undo oedipal masculinization; (...) and a shift toward collective politics. This last and most important step remains tentative. (shrink)

This article argues that people have legitimate interests in privacy that deserve legal protection on democratic principles. It describes the right to privacy as a bundle of rights of personal choice, association and expression and shows that, so described, people have legitimate political interests in privacy. These interests reflect the ways that privacy rights can supplement the protection for people's freedom and equality provided by rights of political choice, association and expression, and can help to make sure that these are, (...) genuinely, democratic. Feminists have often been ambivalent about legal protection for privacy, because privacy rights have, so often, protected the coercion and exploitation of women, and made it difficult to politicise personal forms of injustice. However, attention to the differences between democratic and undemocratic forms of politics can enable us to meet these concerns, and to distinguish a democratic justification of privacy rights from the alternatives. (shrink)

Inaugural lecture as Professor of Women's Studies in the Arts Faculty of the University of Utrecht, May 16, 1990.

Devrions-nous remplacer les élections par des loteries ? Le célèbre livre de Bernard Manin sur le gouvernement représentatif a appris à beaucoup que les Grecs considéraient les élections comme un moyen aristocratique, et non démocratique, de sélectionner des personnes pour le pouvoir et l'autorité politique, en comparaison avec le tirage au sort, où chacun a une chance égale d'être sélectionné. (Manin 1997) Jusqu'à récemment, cependant, l'idée qu'un engagement envers la démocratie nécessite de remplacer les élections par le tirage au sort (...) a suscité peu d'intérêt parmi les philosophes politiques. (Blondiaux, 2008 ; Courant et Sintomer, 2019) Cela a maintenant changé. (Abizadeh 2020) ( A. Guerrero 2014) (A. Guerrero 2021b ; 2021a) (Landemore 2020) (Owen et Smith 2018) (P.-É. Vandamme et al. 2018). Cet article pose donc la question de savoir si le tirage au sort est plus démocratique que les élections et si, pour cette raison, nous devrions l’utiliser pour compléter ou remplacer les élections ? (shrink)