Este artículo intenta poner de manifiesto la importancia que tiene la relación entre derecho y economía en el pensamiento jurídico-político de Kant, y analiza el peculiar modo en que el autor trata el problema de la desigualdad material entre ciudadanos. Para ello, este artículo interpreta los conceptos trascendentales de la filosofía práctica en tensión con su contrapunto empírico. El desarrollo del argumento lleva a buscar en Kant una reflexión jurídica sobre el problema de la excepción, y arroja nueva luz sobre (...) la cuestión de la revolución en su filosofía de la historia. (shrink)

Based on the dispute between Protagoras and Socrates on the origin of ethics, one can ask the question of whether the principle of ethics is reason orfeeling/emotion, or whether ethics is grounded on reason or feeling/emotion. The development of Kant’s thoughts on ethics shows the tension between reason and feeling/emotion. In Kant’s final critical ethics, he held to a principle of “rational a priori.” On the one hand, this is presented as the rational a priori principle being the binding principle (...) of judgment. On the other hand, it is presented as the doctrine of “rational fact” as the ultimate argument of his ethics. Husserl believed that Kant’s doctrine of a rational a priori totally disregarded the a priori essential laws of feeling. Like Husserl, Scheler criticized Kant’s doctrine of a rational a priori, and therefore developed his own theory of an “emotional a priori”. Both of them focused their critiques on the grounding level of ethics. Scheler, however, did not follow Husserl all the way, but criticized him and reflected on his thoughts. At last, he revealed the primary status of a phenomenological material ethics of value. (shrink)

Recent discussions in cognitive science and the philosophy of mind have defended a theory according to which we live in a virtual world akin to a computer simulation, generated by our brain. It is argued that our brain creates a model world from a variety of stimuli; this model is perceived as if it was external and perception-independent, even though it is neither of the two. The view of the mind, brain, and world, entailed by this theory has some peculiar (...) consequences which have rarely been explored in detail. This paper sets out virtual world theory and relates it to various central philosophical problems, the role of the perceiver and the problem of the existence of the external world ). The second part suggests three interpretations of virtual world theory, two familiar ones and a somewhat less familiar one. The remainder of the paper argues that the irrealist interpretation is the one we should adopt. (shrink)

What is mathematics about? And if it is about some sort of mathematical reality, how can we have access to it? This is the problem raised by Plato, which still today is the subject of lively philosophical disputes. This book traces the history of the problem, from its origins to its contemporary treatment. It discusses the answers given by Aristotle, Proclus and Kant, through Frege's and Russell's versions of logicism, Hilbert's formalism, Gödel's platonism, up to the the current debate on (...) Benacerraf's dilemma and the indispensability argument. Through the considerations of themes in the philosophy of language, ontology, and the philosophy of science, the book aims at offering an historically-informed introduction to the philosophy of mathematics, approached through the lenses of its most fundamental problem. (shrink)

I present an argument for an interpretation of Kant's views on the nature of the ‘content [Inhalt]’ of ‘cognition [Erkenntnis]’. In contrast to one of the longest standing interpretations of Kant's views on cognitive content, which ascribes to Kant a straightforwardly psychologistic understanding of content, and in contrast as well to the more recently influential reading of Kant put forward by McDowell and others, according to which Kant embraces a version of Russellianism, I argue that Kant's views on this topic (...) are of a much more Fregean bent than has traditionally been admitted or appreciated. I conclude by providing a sketch of how a better grasp of Kant's views on cognitive content in general can help bring into sharper relief what is, and what is not, at stake in the recent debates over whether Kant accepts a particular kind of cognitive content—namely, non-conceptual content. (shrink)

El artículo presenta la Antropología en sentido pragmático como una obra en la que se manifiesta de manera clara el contenido “material” de la filosofía práctica de Kant. Dicho contenido tiene la peculiaridad de no ser algo arbitrario sino parte fundamental de la filosofía práctica considerada como totalidad, como reunión de crítica y sistema. En este sentido se propone una lectura materialista del texto.

Calling Kant a liberal philosopher requires important qualifications. Much like his theoretical philosophy, his political transcendentalism was and remains a great enterprise of navigating between the extremes of liberalism and conservatism, of balancing the “empirical” and the “pure” in human society, as well as in human mind. Of all the attempts to enlist Kant among the classics of liberalism, John Rawls’ is the most impressive and thorough. However, it is hardly a success. The reason for this lies in a profound (...) difference in their answering the fundamental question “What is Man?”. This paper is an attempt to revise the debate about the extent of Rawls’ Kantianism and to compare the meanings of basic concepts of what could be called “pure political anthropology” in Kant and in Rawls. (shrink)

Die „Prinzipien des öffentlichen Rechts“, welche Kant im zweiten Teil des Anhangs zur Friedensschrift darstellt, wurden sehr unterschiedlich interpretiert. Sind sie wirklich gleichzeitig ethisch und juridisch, a priori und empirisch? Warum „transzendental“ und wie wird es begründet? Was wird als „Publikum“ gemeint? Den Ort der Publizitätsprinzipien in Kants Rechtssystem zu bestimmen, ist keine leichte Aufgabe, die manch neue Frage bezüglich der zulässigen und gewünschten Anwendung jener Prinzipien stellt. Kants Überlegungen zur politischen Publizität folgen einem komplizierten Gang und sind in einer (...) Reihe von Schriften und Vorlesungen dargestellt. Sie führen uns in den Bereich empirischer Praktiken und anthropologischer Beobachtungen. Diese aber erweisen sich entweder als Anlässe zur Suche nach solchen Prinzipien, oder als Beispiele der Anwendung der Rechtsprinzipien, die sich zugleich an einen bestimmten Kreis von Lesern richten. Dementsprechend folgen wir schließlich einer gemäßigten Interpretation und bringen die Publizitätsprinzipien als Prinzipien der Rechtsschöpfung und der Rechtsanwendung in Einklang mit dem Kern der kantischen Rechtslehre und Tugendlehre. (shrink)

A shift away from exclusionary moral reductionism can be discerned in modern interpretations of Kant’s philosophy of religion. Consequently, at least since the 1970s, historical faith has been appreciated as a necessary and desirable element of Kant’s philosophy of religion. One of the reasons prompting Kant to include historical faith in his system of the philosophy of religion is what commentators on Kant’s philosophy call the ‘moral gap’ as there is a disproportion between the limited competence of man as a (...) natural being and moral goals that seem unattainable. For the believer, the content of historical faith offers a real solution to the disproportion between his limitations as a natural being and the goals set for him by practical reason. For the believer, the ‘moral gap’ is not just a theoretical problem, but an existential challenge whose solution lies beyond his own limited competence. In this article, I consider whether historical faith can also provide a theoretical supplement to the picture of one’s own life. If so, then the content of historical faith may also prove important for the non-believer. (shrink)