We investigate in this work the meaning of weak values through the prism of property ascription in quantum systems. Indeed, the weak measurements framework contains only ingredients of the standard quantum formalism, and as such weak measurements are from a technical point of view uncontroversial. However attempting to describe properties of quantum systems through weak values—the output of weak measurements—goes beyond the usual interpretation of quantum mechanics, that relies on eigenvalues. We first recall the usual form of property ascription, based (...) on the eigenstate-eigenvalue link and the existence of “elements of reality”. We then describe against this backdrop the different meanings that have been given to weak values. We finally argue that weak values can be related to a specific form of property ascription, weaker than the eigenvalues case but still relevant to a partial description of a quantum system. (shrink)

A Gedanken experiment is presented where an excited and a ground-state atom are positioned such that, within the former’s half-life time, they exchange a photon with 50% probability. A measurement of their energy state will therefore indicate in 50% of the cases that no photon was exchanged. Yet other measurements would reveal that, by the mere possibility of exchange, the two atoms have become entangled. Consequently, the “no exchange” result, apparently precluding entanglement, is non-locally established between the atoms by this (...) very entanglement. This quantum-mechanical version of the ancient Liar Paradox can be realized with already existing transmission schemes, with the addition of Bell’s theorem applied to the no-exchange cases. Under appropriate probabilities, the initially-excited atom, still excited, can be entangled with additional atoms time and again, or alternatively, exert multipartite nonlocal correlations in an interaction free manner. When densely repeated several times, this result also gives rise to the Quantum Zeno effect, again exerted between distant atoms without photon exchange. We discuss these experiments as variants of interaction-free-measurement, now generalized for both spatial and temporal uncertainties. We next employ weak measurements for elucidating the paradox. Interpretational issues are discussed in the conclusion, and a resolution is offered within the Two-State Vector Formalism and its new Heisenberg framework. (shrink)

In combination with post-selection, weak measurements can lead to surprising results known as anomalous weak values. These lie outside the bounds of the spectrum of the relevant observable, as in the canonical example of measuring the spin of an electron (along some axis) to be 100. We argue that the disturbance caused by the weak measurement, while small, is sufficient to significantly affect the measurement result, and that this is the most reasonable explanation of anomalous weak values.

The aim of this thesis dissertation is to propose a novel position in the debate on scientific realism, modal empiricism, and to show its fruitfulness when it comes to interpreting the cognitive content of scientific theories. Modal empiricism is an empiricist position, according to which the aim of science is to produce empirically adequate theories rather than true theories. However, it suggests adopting a broader comprehension of experience than traditional versions of empiricism, through a commitment to natural modalities. Following modal (...) empiricism, there are possibilities in nature, and constraints on what is possible, and a theory is empirically adequate if it correctly delimits the range of possible experiences. The position rests on a situated and pragmatic conception of natural modalities and of empirical confrontation. We claim that it can do justice to the empirical success of science, while not falling prey to the problem of theory change that undermines scientific realism. We explain how constraints of necessity on phenomena can be known by induction, and how this modal epistemology fits with scientific practice. Finally, we claim that a commitment to natural modalities allows for a rich interpretation of the cognitive content of theories. Modal empiricism could renew some metaphysical debates within a pragmatist framework, by tying them to experience and not being constrained by realist prejudices. -/- L'objet de cette thèse est de proposer une position originale dans le débat sur le réalisme scientifique, l'empirisme modal, et d'en démontrer la fructuosité quand il s'agit de tirer des enseignements du contenu cognitif des théories scientifiques. L'empirisme modal est une position empiriste, suivant laquelle le but de la science n'est pas de produire des théories vraies, mais des théories empiriquement adéquate. Cependant, il propose d'adopter un cadre plus large que les versions traditionnelles d'empirisme pour penser l'expérience, en incorporant un engagement envers les modalités naturelles, ou l'idée qu'il y a du possible dans la nature, et des contraintes sur les possibles. Nos théories sont empiriquement adéquates si elles délimitent correctement l'étendue des expériences possibles. Cette position s'appuie sur une conception située et pragmatique des modalités naturelles et de la confrontation empirique. Nous prétendons qu'elle est à même de rendre justice au succès empirique des sciences, sans pour autant faire face au problème du changement théorique qui mine le réalisme scientifique. Nous expliquons comment les contraintes de nécessité sur les phénomènes peuvent être connues à l'issue d'une induction, et en quoi cette façon de voir s'accorde avec la pratique scientifique. Enfin, nous affirmons qu'un engagement envers les modalités naturelles offre une richesse interprétative à même de renouveler, dans un cadre pragmatiste, plus ouvert que le réalisme, certaines questions métaphysiques tout en les ramenant à l'expérience . (shrink)

The quantum mechanical measurement process is analyzed by means of an explicit generic model describing the interaction between object and measuring device. The solution of the Schrödinger equation for the whole system reflects the ‘collapse’ of the object wave function. A necessary condition is a sufficiently sharply peaked initial measurement device wave function, which is guaranteed in its classical limit. With this assumption, it is in particular proven that the off-diagonal elements of the object density matrix vanish. This study therefore (...) shows the reduction of the object state to be a consequence of Hamiltonian evolution of the total system. (shrink)

Despite their important applications in metrology and in spite of numerous experimental demonstrations, weak measurements are still confusing for part of the community. This sometimes leads to unjustified criticism. Recent papers have experimentally clarified the meaning and practical significance of weak measurements, yet in Kastner, Kastner seems to take us many years backwards in the the debate, casting doubt on the very term “weak value” and the meaning of weak measurements. Kastner appears to ignore both the basics and frontiers of (...) weak measurements and misinterprets the weak measurement process and its outcomes. In addition, she accuses the authors of Aharonov et al. in statements completely opposite to the ones they have actually made. There are many points of disagreement between Kastner and us, but in this short reply I will leave aside the ontology and focus mainly on the injustice in her criticism. I shall add some general comments regarding the broader theory of weak measurements and the two-state-vector formalism, as well as supporting experimental results. Finally, I will point out some recent promising results, which can be proven by projective measurements, without the need of employing weak measurements. (shrink)