Understanding positive emotions' shared and differentiating features can yield valuable insight into the structure of positive emotion space and identify emotion states, or aspects of emotion states, that are most relevant for particular psychological processes and outcomes. We report two studies that examined core relational themes (Study 1) and expressive displays (Study 2) for eight positive emotion constructs—amusement, awe, contentment, gratitude, interest, joy, love, and pride. Across studies, all eight emotions shared one quality: high positive valence. Distinctive core relational theme (...) and expressive display patterns were found for four emotions—amusement, awe, interest, and pride. Gratitude was associated with a distinct core relational theme but not an expressive display. Joy and love were each associated with a distinct expressive display but their core relational themes also characterised pride and gratitude, respectively. Contentment was associated with a distinct expressive display but not a core relational theme. The implications of this work for the study of positive emotion are discussed. (shrink)

This study was designed to address the issue of whether there is a general processor for the perception of emotion or whether there are separate processors. We examined the relationships among three channels of emotional communication in 100 healthy right-handed adult males and females. The channels were facial, prosodic/intonational, and lexical/verbal; both identification and discrimination tasks of emotional perception were utilised. Statistical analyses controlled for nonemotional perceptual factors and subject characteristics (i.e. demographic and general cognitive). For identification, multiple significant correlations (...) were found among the channels. For discrimination, fewer correlations were significant. Overall, these results provide support for the notion of a general processor for emotional perceptual identification in normal adult subjects. (shrink)

Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of Hawaii at Manoa, 2008.

It is characteristic that in consideration of the issues related to feeling, one encounters a problem of its definition; it is not only about determining the essence of feeling itself but first it must be explained how we understand and use the word ’feeling’. We could give examples from Polish, German, French, English and Latin as well as Ancient Greek to look into the issue of determining ’feeling’ as a language category. Feeling is described by words that are not cognates (...) in these languages; also, the terms function in ways that overlap only partially, so they are only partial counterparts. Does it mean that the very essence of feeling is different or appears as something different to the speakers of the many languages? Or is it that some languages create the word ’feeling’ more skillfully than others, some rendering it more aptly than others? Or maybe giving a name to feeling exceeds the capacity of language? Does the lack of the equivalent of the Polish word uczucie in the Greek language mean, as is often presupposed, that feeling was beyond the ancient philosophers’, psychologists’ or poets’ perception? (shrink)

Philosophical discussions regarding the status of emotion as a scientific domain usually get framed in terms of the question whether emotion is a natural kind. That approach to the issues is wrongheaded for two reasons. First, it has led to an intractable philosophical impasse that ultimately misconstrues the character of the relevant debate in emotion science. Second, and most important, it entirely ignores valence, a central feature of emotion experience, and probably the most promising criterion for demarcating emotion from cognition (...) and other related domains. An alternate philosophical hypothesis for addressing the issues is pro- posed. It is that emotion is a naturally occurring valenced phenomenon that is.. (shrink)

The classical dichotomical framework has shaped the western conceptualization of emotions and is still alive in our common imagery impregnating our own assumptions about the polarity emotion/reason. Thereby, my main purpose is to suggest that another framework can be defended. In order to it, I will firstly analyse the basis of this logic, as well as I will also offer a critique of its main principles and consequences. Finally, as a way of surpassing the old dichotomic model, I will argue (...) in favour of the links between reason and emotions taking into account the new evidences found over the last decades. To conclude, I will point out some of the benefits of replacing a dualistic framework by an interactive one. (shrink)