Studies of knowledge utilization in public policy-making have important practical and theoretical implications. Accordingly, a voluminous work has been done on understanding and explaining the process of knowledge utilization (see Rich and Oh, 1993). However, we can easily find that there is the conspicuous absence of a greatly expanded understanding of the use of knowledge from those studies (Mandell and Sauter, 1984). Taken as a whole, empirical studies in the area of knowledge utilization have suffered from several critical problems (see (...) Rich, 1991; Oh, 1996a). More importantly, there appears to be serious conceptual and methodological gaps which need to be filled. This article focuses on one of the most significant methodological problems: measuring “knowledge utilization” from an evaluation perspective and offers some suggestions for future studies. (shrink)

The distinction between basic and applied research is notoriously vague, despite its frequent use in science studies and in science policy. In most cases it is based on such pragmatic factors as the knowledge and intentions of the investigator or the type of research institute. Sometimes the validity of the distinction is denied altogether. This paper suggests that there are two ways of distinguishing systematically between basic and applied research: (i) in terms of the utilities that define the aims of (...) inquiry, and (ii) by reference to the structure of the relevant knowledge claims. An important type of applied research aims at results that are expressed by techical norms (in von Wright's sense): if you wish to achieveA, and you believe you are in a situationB, then you should doX. This conception of design sciences allows us to re-evaluate many issues in the history, philosophy, and ethics of science. (shrink)

This essay criticizes the current approach to epistemic democracy. Epistemic democrats are preoccupied with the question of how a society can best exploit a given stock of knowledge. This article argues that the problem-solving capability of a society depends on two factors rather than one. The quality of decision-making depends both on how a democracy is able to make use of its stock of knowledge and on the size of the knowledge stock. Society’s problem-solving capability over time is therefore a (...) function of its ability to develop its knowledge exploitation mechanisms and the growth rate of its knowledge stock. Based on this enhanced model of social problem-solving, this essay compares two different political ideal types: experimental democracy, as commonly defended by epistemic democrats; and polycentric democracy, a model defended most commonly by political economists. (shrink)

This paper examines the broad social purpose of US climate science, which has benefitted from a public investment of more than $30 billion over the last 20 years. A public values analysis identifies five core public values that underpin the interagency program. Drawing from interviews, meeting observations, and document analysis, I examine the decision processes and institutional structures that lead to the implementation of climate science policy, and identify a variety of public values failures accommodated by this system. In contrast (...) to other cases which find market values frameworks (the profit as progress assumption) at the root of public values failures, this case shows how science values ( knowledge as progress ) may serve as an inadequate or inappropriate basis for achieving broader public values. For both institutions and individual decision makers, the logic linking science to societal benefit is generally incomplete, incoherent, and tends to conflate intrinsic and instrumental values. I argue that to be successful with respect to its motivating public values, the US climate science enterprise must avoid the assumption that any advance in knowledge is inherently good, and offer a clearer account of the kinds of research and knowledge advance likely to generate desirable social outcomes. (shrink)

Applied sociology will be understood in the following discussion as a unique and original form of sociology; i.e., in its logic and practice distinguished from traditional sociology it is understood as an explanatory body of knowledge and an intellectual discourse about intentional/purposeful social action and behavior. The application of sociology proper to such substantive fields as family, art, law and sport, commonly called applied sociology, which reproduce the body of sociological knowledge just a second time, is not part of such (...) understanding. Applied sociology in its original sense has its own logic in which purpose, implementation and the process of social-problem solution are crucial. It will in the end lead to an applied action or implementation theory. It is, to paraphrase Lazarsfeld, the methodology of “sociology in action” (1960). (shrink)

This paper develops hypotheses about the implications of different types of decision for the utilization of different types of systematically produced information: data, research, and analysis. The engineering and enlightenment models found in the knowledge utilization literature prove inadequate for this purpose. We turn to three decision models—routine, incremental, and fundamental–and determine their implied demands for information. We also examine how information might be used in scanning procedures in anticipation of decision regime shifts. The results suggest that patterns of information (...) should differ markedly in each decision context and indicate that there may be an inherent bias against the use of research in decision. (shrink)

Regulating technologies, innovations and risks is an activity that, as much as scientific research needs proofs and evidence. It is the site of development of a distinct kind of science, regulatory science. This special issue addresses the question of the standards of knowledge governing how we test, assess and monitor technologies and their effects. This topic is relevant and timely in the light of problematics of regulation of innovation, regulatory failure and capture. Given the enormous decisions and stakes regulatory science (...) commends, it becomes crucial to ask where its standards come from and gain credibility, but also what valuations of technology and appreciations of their risks or benefits do they embed, and who controls them? This paper introduces the four contributions comprising the special issue, and outlines a perspective from which to question the construction of regulatory science or, in the terminology adopted here, the authorization and standardization of regulatory knowledge, particularly the role of networks of scientific experts therein. (shrink)