The modern popularity of the Kantian definition of enlightenment often leads to a distorted notion that his understanding of enlightenment was dominant already during his lifetime, expressing the quintessence of all-European Enlightenment. This turns our attention away from entire layers of philosophical thought, since the Kantian definition of enlightenment in the late eighteenth century was neither the only one nor the preeminent one. The study of alternatives represented in the German philosophy of that period gives a deeper insight into the (...) originality of the Kantian approach with regard to both its merits and demerits. The presentation of the Kantian definition of enlightenment as the standard turns out to be a rather late historical phenomenon. Even Kant’s closest followers did not turn to his interpretation of enlightenment and, indeed, were sharply critical of the phenomenon as a banal and superficial one, opposed to faith. Further transformation of the views on the Enlightenment led to the emergence of the inauthentic terms of “Enlightenment” and Lumières applied post factum to the eighteenth-century philosophy in Europe. As a result, the essence of the enlightenment was defined not so much by the eighteenth-century Enlighteners as by historians and philosophers in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries who constructed a model notion of enlightenment against which philosophical figures were then compared. This approach ignored, first, the authentic definition of enlightenment (in Germany and Russia in the eighteenth century there were authentic terms “Aufklärung” and “prosveshcheniye”, and in France the proto-term “eclairé”) and, second, important national differences in the interpretation of the phenomenon. The emasculate Kantian definition of enlightenment used to legitimise the proposed approach. A closer look at the authentic view of eighteenth-century philosophers and a comparison of the Kantian approach to enlightenment with its alternatives that existed at the time might perhaps demonstrate that the philosophical and heuristic potential of the allegedly overcome and discredited Enlightenment is far from exhausted and is still relevant today. (shrink)

Some ideas expressed in the collective monograph Universality in Morality (2020), edited by Ruben Apressyan, are here critically examined. The book is based on the results of a large-scale study by professional ethical philosophers devoted to the question of the nature of universality in morality and the mechanisms of universalisation of individual maxims and norms from antiquity to modern ethical theories, represented above all by the analytical tradition in philosophy. Of great interest is the analysis of related phenomena in morality, (...) which makes it possible to determine the causes and nature of the transformation of morality in different eras and the accompanying change in the terminological apparatus of absolute ethical universalism, considered to be the starting point in the analysis of key modern concepts of moral universality. The article also suggests possible avenues for continued research in this area which could prompt modifications not only to the history of the concept of universality in morality, but also to our assessment of the contribution of individual authors and entire eras to the progress of human civilisation. This concerns above all the moral theory of contractarianism and the Enlightenment. Focus on their ideas goes a long way to determining the direction of current historical-philosophical research that reconstructs the history of ethical teachings and individual concepts. The importance attached today to a new view of the theory of the social contract, considered not only from socio-political but also from moral positions, forces us to approach in a new way the question concerning the universality of the key philosophical categories developed within this theory throughout its history. Elaborating the ideas set forth in the monograph, the author also stresses the relevance of the problem of justifying the thesis about the moral law as an analogue of the universal law of nature in the modern context. (shrink)

The starting point of my study is Kant’s remark to the effect that Garve in his treatise on the connection between morality and politics presents arguments in defence of unjust principles. Recognition of these principles is, according to Kant, an inadvisable concession to those who are inclined to abuse it. I interpret this judgement by making a detailed comparison of the texts of the two treatises. I demonstrate that Garve’s work is an eclectic attempt to combine in one concept the (...) lessons of historical experience with the ideas drawn from British empiricism and German rationalism. These ideas were criticised by Kant in his “critical” period. There is a consensus among researchers that Garve condoned the expansionist policy of Frederick II of Prussia, totally denied that legality in international relations was possible and in general deserved the reputation of an conservative. From that point of view the key values for Garve were the security and well-being of the state. I offer an alternative interpretation of Garve’s position because I believe that the value of political stability plays an important role in it. Such an interpretation makes it possible to treat Garve’s narrative as it was assessed by Kant, i.e. as a concession to the common principles of political practice as a result of a failure to find the guiding theory. My study has established that the role of Garve’s work in the writing of Kant’s treatise Toward Perpetual Peace was more significant than Kant’s own words suggest. Besides, I show that it was under Garve’s influence that Kant turned to the problem of excessive complexity of the principles involved in the search for concrete political decisions. Garve obviously laments this complexity and yet makes these principles still more complex. Kant offers a simpler solution of the problem on the basis of his theory of morals and right. (shrink)

In the course of a close analysis of Kant’s essay in which he gives his original answer to the question, “What is Enlightenment?” I examine the causes and consequences of the theses about Enlightenment which makes a plea for emancipation from the shackles of guardianship, above all by getting rid of one’s own cowardice. In search of an answer to the question, “What is the real reason of self-incurred immaturity?” I consider the bifurcation: Is it all about unjust social institutions (...) established in the interests of the ruling social estates, as the best European brains contended throughout the Enlightenment era, thus anticipating and justifying revolutionary upheavals, or is it within ourselves who have refused to use our reason independently and regularly? — something which Kant unequivocally considers to be everyone’s special kind of guilt. Following Kant, I look for an answer to the question, “Which limits impede Enlightenment, and which limits, far from obstructing it, are bound to promote it?” and reveal the hidden paradox of the Kantian solution: maturity has to be preceded by the granting of freedoms; and the granting of freedoms in turn calls for a mature public. I also ask the question, “Whose yoke is heavier, one’s own or the guardian’s?” and offer my version of an answer. In conclusion, I assemble all parts of the complicated and original formula of the Kantian recipe of Enlightenment. Among other things, I reveal a special type of bonding within the social organism implied by Kant, and that is the requirement to obey those who are not above us in thinking and the right to speak out in public, which ultimately means not only personal maturity, but implies also the maturity of society’s functioning in accordance with the said maxim. (shrink)