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Legal reasoning

In K. Holyoak & B. Morrison (eds.), The Cambridge handbook of thinking and reasoning. Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press. pp. 685--704 (2005)

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  1. Norms of Public Argumentation and the Ideals of Correctness and Participation.Frank Zenker, Jan Albert van Laar, B. Cepollaro, A. Gâţă, M. Hinton, C. G. King, B. Larson, M. Lewiński, C. Lumer, S. Oswald, M. Pichlak, B. D. Scott, M. Urbański & J. H. M. Wagemans - 2024 - Argumentation 38 (1):7-40.
    Argumentation as the public exchange of reasons is widely thought to enhance deliberative interactions that generate and justify reasonable public policies. Adopting an argumentation-theoretic perspective, we survey the norms that should govern public argumentation and address some of the complexities that scholarly treatments have identified. Our focus is on norms associated with the ideals of correctness and participation as sources of a politically legitimate deliberative outcome. In principle, both ideals are mutually coherent. If the information needed for a correct deliberative (...)
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  • Epistemic Norms for Public Political Arguments.Christoph Lumer - 2024 - Argumentation 38 (1):63-83.
    The aim of the article is to develop precise epistemic rules for good public political arguments, by which political measures in the broad sense are justified. By means of a theory of deliberative democracy, it is substantiated that the justification of a political measure consists in showing argumentatively that this measure most promotes the common good or is morally optimal. It is then discussed which argumentation-theoretical approaches are suitable for providing epistemically sound rules for arguments for such theses and for (...)
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  • Common-law judicial reasoning and analogy.Adam Rigoni - 2014 - Legal Theory 20 (2):133-156.
    Proponents of strict rule-based theories of judicial reasoning in common-law systems have offered a number of criticisms of analogical alternatives. I explain these criticisms and show that at best they apply equally well to rule-based theories. Further, I show how the analogical theories explain a feature of judicial common-law reasoningthat rule-based theories ignore. Finally, I show that reason-based, analogical theories of common-law judicial reasoning, such as those offered by John Horty and Grant Lamond, offer especially strong rejoinders to the rule-theorist (...)
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  • Defeasibility in Judicial Opinion: Logical or Procedural?David Godden & Douglas Walton - 2008 - Informal Logic 28 (1):6-19.
    While defeasibility in legal reasoning has been the subject of recent scholarship, it has yet to be studied in the context of judicial opinion. Yet, being subject to appeal, judicial decisions can default for a variety of reasons. Prakken (2001) argued that the defeasibility affecting reasoning involved in adversarial legal argumentation is best analysed as procedural rather than logical. In this paper we argue that the defeasibility of ratio decendi is similarly best explained and modeled in a procedural and dialectical (...)
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  • A collaboration between judge and machine to reduce legal uncertainty in disputes concerning ex aequo et bono compensations.Wim De Mulder, Peggy Valcke & Joke Baeck - 2023 - Artificial Intelligence and Law 31 (2):325-333.
    Ex aequo et bono compensations refer to tribunal’s compensations that cannot be determined exactly according to the rule of law, in which case the judge relies on an estimate that seems fair for the case at hand. Such cases are prone to legal uncertainty, given the subjectivity that is inherent to the concept of fairness. We show how basic principles from statistics and machine learning may be used to reduce legal uncertainty in ex aequo et bono judicial decisions. For a (...)
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