Switch to: References

Citations of:

Moral insanity and practical reason

Carl Elliott & Grant Gillett

Philosophical Psychology 5 (1):53 – 67 (1992)

Add citations

You must login to add citations.

Psychopathy, Agency, and Practical Reason.Monique Wonderly - 2021 - In Ruth Chang & Kurt Sylvan (eds.), Routledge Handbook of Practical Reason. New York, USA: Routledge. pp. 262-275.details Philosophers have urged that considerations about the psychopath’s capacity for practical rationality can help to advance metaethical debates. These debates include the role of rational faculties in moral judgment and action, the relationship between moral judgment and moral motivation, and the capacities required for morally responsible agency. I discuss how the psychopath’s capacity for practical reason features in these debates, and I identify several takeaway lessons from the relevant literature. Specifically, I show how the insights contained therein can illuminate the (...) Download Export citation Bookmark
Moral madness.David Carr - 2010 - Philosophical Investigations 33 (2):103-125.details One clear reason why human agents often act badly is because they are insufficiently attentive to moral considerations and concerns, or tempted to ignore these in pursuit of more immediate satisfactions. In so far as madness, insanity or mental instability may be regarded as undermining moral agency, it might also be supposed that such madness attaches more to the non-moral than the moral reasons or motives of agents. Still, the well-known quote from Chesterton at the start of this paper may (...) Download Export citation Bookmark
Autonomy, enactivism, and psychopathy.Michelle Maiese - 2021 - Philosophical Explorations 25 (1):19-41.details Most philosophical discussions of psychopathy have centered around its significance in relation to empathy, moral cognition, or moral responsibility. However, related questions about the extent to... Download Export citation Bookmark 2 citations
Autonomy, enactivism, and psychopathy.Michelle Maiese - 2021 - Philosophical Explorations 25 (1):19-41.details Most philosophical discussions of psychopathy have centered around its significance in relation to empathy, moral cognition, or moral responsibility. However, related questions about the extent to... Download Export citation Bookmark 2 citations
What We Owe the Psychopath: A Neuroethical Analysis.Grant Gillett & Jiaochen Huang - 2013 - American Journal of Bioethics Neuroscience 4 (2):3-9.details Psychopaths are often regarded as a scourge of contemporary society and, as such, are the focus of much public vilification and outrage. But, arguably, psychopaths are both sinned against as well as sinners. If that is true, then their status as the victims of abusive subcultures partially mitigates their moral responsibility for the harms they cause. We argue, from the neuroethics of psychopathy and antisocial personality disorder (ASPD), that communities have a moral obligation to psychopaths as well as a case (...) Download Export citation Bookmark 17 citations
'Ought' and well-being.Grant Gillett - 1993 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 36 (3):287 – 306.details The idea that there is an inherent incentive in moral judgment or, in Classical terms, that there is an essential relationship between virtue and well?being is sharply criticized in contemporary moral theory. The associated theses that there is a way of living which is objectively good for human beings and that living that way is part of understanding moral truth are equally problematic. The Aristotelian argument proceeded via the premise that a human being was a rational social being. The present (...) Download Export citation Bookmark 2 citations
Mental impairment, moral understanding and criminal responsibility: Psychopathy and the purposes of punishment.Cordelia Fine & Jeanette Kennett - 2004 - International Journal of Law and Psychiatry 27 (5):425-443.details We have argued here that to attribute criminal responsibility to psychopathic individuals is to ignore substantial and growing evidence that psychopathic individuals are significantly impaired in moral understanding. They do not appear to know why moral transgressions are wrong in the full sense required by the law. As morally blameless offenders, punishment as a basis for detention cannot be justified. Moreover, as there are currently no successful treatment programs for psychopathy, nor can detention be justified on grounds of treatment. Instead, (...) Download Export citation Bookmark 37 citations

1