Priority setting in health care is ubiquitous and health authorities are increasingly recognising the need for priority setting guidelines to ensure efficient, fair, and equitable resource allocation. While cost-effectiveness concerns seem to dominate many policies, the tension between utilitarian and deontological concerns is salient to many, and various severity criteria appear to fill this gap. Severity, then, must be subjected to rigorous ethical and philosophical analysis. Here we first give a brief history of the path to today’s severity criteria in (...) Norway and Sweden. The Scandinavian perspective on severity might be conducive to the international discussion, given its long-standing use as a priority setting criterion, despite having reached rather different conclusions so far. We then argue that severity can be viewed as a multidimensional concept, drawing on accounts of need, urgency, fairness, duty to save lives, and human dignity. Such concerns will often be relative to local mores, and the weighting placed on the various dimensions cannot be expected to be fixed. Thirdly, we present what we think are the most pertinent questions to answer about severity in order to facilitate decision making in the coming years of increased scarcity, and to further the understanding of underlying assumptions and values that go into these decisions. We conclude that severity is poorly understood, and that the topic needs substantial further inquiry; thus we hope this article may set a challenging and important research agenda. (shrink)

These CQ Sources were compiled by Bette Anton.

These CQ Sources were compiled by Bette Anton.

We have examined healthcare staff attitudes of toward a blogging cancer patient who publishes critical posts about her treatment and their possible effect on patient-staff relationships and treatment decisions. We used two versions of a questionnaire containing a vignette based on a modified real case involving a 39-year-old cancer patient who complained on her blog about how she was encountered and the treatment she received. Initially she was not offered a new, and expensive treatment, which might have influenced her perception (...) of further encounters. In one version of the vignette, the team decides to put extra effort into both encounters and offers the expensive new cancer treatment. In the other version, the team decides to follow the clinic’s routine to the letter. Subsequently, blog postings became either positive or negative in tone. We also divided participants into value-neutral and value-influenced groups by asking how their trust in healthcare would be affected if the team’s suggestion were followed. A total of 56 % of the respondents faced with a team decision to ‘do something-extra’ in encounters would act in accordance with this ambition. Concerning treatment, 32 % would follow the team’s decision to offer a new and expensive treatment. A large majority of those who received the “follow-routine” version agreed to do so in encountering [94 % ]. Similar proportions were found regarding treatment [86 % ]. A total of 83 % of the value-neutral participants who received the “do-something-extra” version stated that they would act as the team suggested regarding encounters, while 57 % would do so in regard to treatment. Among the value-influenced participants who received the “do-something-extra” version, 45 % stated that they would make an extra effort to accommodate the patient and her needs, while the proportion for treatment was 22 %. Among those who had received the “follow-routine” version, a large majority agreed, and no difference was indicated between the value-neutral and the value-influenced participants. The present study indicates that healthcare staff is indeed influenced by reading a patient’s critical blog entries, largely regarding encounters, but also concerning treatment is concerned. Value-neutral healthcare personnel seem to exhibit a pragmatic attitude and be more inclined to heed and respond to a patient whose criticism may well be warranted. The study also indicates that healthcare staff is partly positive or negative to future blogging patients depending on how the issue has been framed. For future research we suggest as a bold hypothesis that the phrase “clinical routine” might conceal power aspects masquerading as adopted ethical principles. (shrink)

What challenges must a principle of need for prioritisations in health care meet in order to be plausible and practically useful? Some progress in answering this question has recently been made by Hope, Østerdal and Hasman. This article continue their work by suggesting that the characteristic feature of principles of needs is that they are sufficientarian, saying that we have a right to a minimally acceptable or good life or health, but nothing more. Accordingly, principles of needs must answer two (...) distributive questions: when do we have sufficient and how should we prioritise among those who do not yet have a sufficiency? Furthermore, it is argued that Roger Crisp’s theory of need, which combines sufficientarianism with prioritarianism below the threshold of need, is better equipped than alternatives to answer these questions as well as meeting the challenges formulated by Hope, Østerdal and Hasman. However, Crisp’s theory faces two major challenges. First, it has to say something about the currency of distribution: a principle of need must be complemented either with a theory on the human good or a theory about the proper goals of health care. Second, it has to say something about where the threshold should be set. However, any attempt to set a threshold seems morally arbitrary in the light of the sufficientarian idea that those just above the threshold never should be given priority over those just below the threshold. (shrink)

In this article we argue that the principle of need, on some interpretations, could be used to justify the spending of publically funded health care resources on cognitive enhancement and that this also holds true for individuals whose cognitive capacities are considered normal.The increased, and to an extent, novel demands that the modern technology and information society places on the cognitive capacities of agents, e.g., regarding good and responsible decision-making, have blurred the line between treatment and enhancement. More specifically, it (...) has shifted upwards. As a consequence, principles of need on their most reasonable interpretations can be used to support publically funded cognitive enhancement. At least this is so, if broader aims than curing and ameliorating diseases are included in the goals of health care. We suggest that it would be plausible to see health care as accepting such broader goals already today. (shrink)