The books’ goal is to answer the question: Do the weaknesses of value-free economics imply the need for a paradigm shift? The author synthesizes criticisms from different perspectives (descriptive and methodological). Special attention is paid to choices over time, because in this area value-free economics has the most problems. In that context, the enriched concept of multiple self is proposed and investigated. However, it is not enough to present the criticisms towards value-free economics. For scientists, a bad paradigm is better (...) than no paradigm. Therefore, the author considers whether value-based economics with normative approaches such as economics of happiness, capability approach, libertarian paternalism, and the concept of multiple self can be the alternative paradigm for value-free economics. This book is essential reading to everyone interested in the current state of economics as a discipline. (shrink)

Social identity poses one of the most important challenges to rational choice theory, but rational choice theorists do not hold a common position regarding identity. On one hand, externalist rational choice ignores the concept of identity or reduces it to revealed preferences. On the other hand, internalist rational choice considers identity as a key concept in explaining social action because it permits expressive motivations to be included in the models. However, internalist theorists tend to reduce identity to desire—the desire of (...) a person to express his or her social being. From an internalist point of view, that is, from a viewpoint in which not only desires but also beliefs play a key role in social explanations as mental entities, this article rejects externalist reductionism and proposes a redefinition of social identity as a net of beliefs about oneself, beliefs that are indexical, robust, and socially shaped. (shrink)

The dichotomy between emotion and rationality has been one of the most enduring of sociological theory. This article attempts to bypass this dichotomy by examining how emotion and rationality are conjoined in the practice of the choice of a mate. We posit the fundamental role of culture in determining the nature of this intertwinement. We explore the culturally embedded intertwining of emotion and rationality through the notion of modal configuration. Modal configuration includes five key features: reflexivity, techniques, modal emphasis, modal (...) overlap, and modal sequencing. We apply this framework to the topic of partner selection. Comparing primary and secondary sources on pre-modern partner selection and on internet dating, we show that emotion and rationality were intertwined in both periods but that what differs between them is precisely the emotion-rationality modality. (shrink)

In this article, we present a contextually embedded choice theory. Using concepts and tools of poset mathematics, we show how to include in rational choice theory cultural and social effects. Specifically, we define some choice superstructures, seen as choice set transformations imposed by cultural and social norms. As we shall argue, these transformations can be of help to explain choice behavior within different contexts. Moreover, we show that, once choice superstructures are taken into account, some well-known results about maximizing and (...) optimizing behavior are easily confirmed and some insights on intransitive choices may be phased out. (shrink)

This article deals with the rationality and functionality of the existence of regret and its influence on decision making. First, regret is defined as a negative, cognitively based emotion that we experience when realizing or imagining that our present situation would have been better had we acted differently. Next, it is discussed whether this experience can be considered rational and it is argued that rationality only applies to what we do with our regrets, not to the experience itself. Then, research (...) is reviewed showing that both the anticipation of future regret and the experience of retrospective regret influence behavior. The influence of anticipated regret can be considered rational as long as the decision maker can accurately predict the regret that may result from the decision. The influence of experienced regret cannot be considered rational, since decisions should be based on future outcomes, not historical ones. However, influence of experienced regret can be called functional since it may result in increased learning from our mistakes. (shrink)

ZusammenfassungEine Analyse empirisch ausgerichteter Beiträge zu sportsoziologischen Themen und Fragestellungen in der vorliegenden Zeitschrift zeigt, dass gängige sozialwissenschaftliche Erklärungsmodelle bzw. Erklärungsansätze selten zum Einsatz gelangen. Es dominiert meist eine beschreibende und verstehende Methodologie. Dies führt u. a. zu einem Defizit von Erklärungswissen und in Folge wohl auch zu einer verlangsamten Theoriefundierung innerhalb der Sportsoziologie. Um die „erklärende Soziologie“ zu forcieren, werden die aktuell in der Soziologie detailreich und auch kontrovers diskutierten methodischen Erklärungsmodelle und Ansätze einschließlich ihrer Voraussetzungsbedingungen skizzierend dargestellt. Dies (...) geschieht in der Hoffnung, die methodologische Anwendungslücke zu minimieren, da eine auf Erkenntniszuwächse ausgerichtete Sportsoziologie nicht auf eine kriterienorientierte Methodologie verzichten sollte. (shrink)

This research examines the moderating role of regret aversion in reason-based choice. Earlier research has shown that regret aversion and reason-based choice effects are linked through a common emphasis on decision justification, and that a simple manipulation of regret salience can eliminate the decoy effect, a well-known reason-based choice effect. We show here that the effect of regret salience varies in theory-relevant ways from one reason-based choice effect to another. For effects such as the select/reject and decoy effect, both of (...) which were independently judged to be unreasonable bases for deciding, regret salience eliminated the effect. For the most-important attribute effect that is judged to be normatively acceptable, however, regret salience amplified the effect. Anticipated self-blame regret and perceived decision justifiability consistently predicted preferences and thus offer a parsimonious account of both attenuation and amplification of these reason-based choice effects. (shrink)

This paper formalizes part of a well-known psychological model of emotions. In particular, the logical structure underlying the conditions that trigger emotions are studied and then hierarchically organized. The insights gained therefrom are used to guide a formalization of emotion triggers, which proceeds in three stages. The first stage captures the conditions that trigger emotions in a semiformal way, i.e., without committing to an underlying formalism and semantics. The second stage captures the main psychological notions used in the emotion model (...) in dynamic doxastic logic. The third stage introduces a BDI-based framework (belief–desire–intention) with achievement goals, which is used to firmly ground the preceding stages. The result is a formalization of emotion triggers for BDI agents with achievement goals. The idea of proceeding in these stages is to provide different levels of commitment to formalisms, so that it remains relatively easy to extend or replace the used formalisms without having to start from scratch. Finally, we show that the formalization renders properties of emotions that are in line with the psychological model on which it is based. (shrink)

Trustful interaction serves the interests of those involved. Thus, one could reason that trust itself may be analyzed as part of rational, goaloriented action. In contrast, common sense tells us that trust is an emotion and is, therefore, independent of rational deliberation to some extent. I will argue that we are right in trusting our common sense. My argument is conceptual in nature, referring to the common distinction between trust and pure reliance. An emotional attitude may be understood as some (...) general pattern in the way the world or some part of the world is perceived by an individual. Trust may be characterized by such a pattern. I shall focus on two central features of a trusting attitude. First, trust involves a participant attitude (Strawson) toward the person being trusted. Second, a situation of trust is perceived by a trusting person as one in which shared values or norms motivate both his own actions as well as those of the person being trusted. As an emotional attitude, trust is, to some extent, independent of objective information. It determines what a trusting person will believe and how various outcomes are evaluated. Hence, trust is quite different from rational belief and the problem with trust is not adequately met in minimizing risk by supplying extensive information or some mechanism of sanctioning. Trust is an attitude that enables us to cope with risk in a certain way. If we want to promote trustful interaction, we must form our institutions in ways that allow individuals to experience their interest and values as shared and, thus, to develop a trusting attitude. (shrink)

In the modern world, situations often arise in which the value-based regulation of human activity weakens and the old requirements lose their relevance. The need for analysis is associated with the “normality” of the state of anormativity as an attribute of a new social status relating to the sphere of government. The purpose of this article is to study the dynamics of the development of values and norms as a possible reason for the inefficiency of managerial decisions. The sociocultural method (...) made it possible to consider the individual, the person and society as a single integral system in which the elements are not reducible to each other, as well as to describe the conflict of values and norms as a complex of sociocultural pathologies leading to ineffective managerial decisions. Value analysis was used to reveal the content of the conflict of values and norms and their manifestations in culture and to describe the axiological mechanisms of sociocultural interactions. The hermeneutical method made it possible to identify and study the factors of conflict between values and norms and to form an idea of value consciousness. The structural-functional approach was used to identify elements of society and culture that contribute to the emergence of a conflict of values and norms. The phenomenological method was useful in the analysis of the conflict of values and norms as a pathological state (deformation) of human consciousness. Methods of comparison, analysis, deduction, induction, generalization, analogy, classification, abstraction were also used. Value-normative and institutional analysis made it possible to clarify the nature of the norm and to define a negative value convention. It was found that the change in values is carried out through value consciousness as a special phenomenological feature of a person, the main pathology of which is fragmentation, which leads to a conflict of values and norms. In particular, the idea of interaction between value-normative and institutional analysis was introduced, which made it possible to clarify the nature of the norm, define a negative value convention, and also distinguish between two ways of thinking and behavior as a prerequisite for a conflict of values and norms: based on common axiological attitudes and particular institutions. It was determined that with the help of norms, society leaves a reflection on values, and social actors are able to initiate the normization of certain actions. If these actions do not correspond to norms and values, a process of denormization takes place, as a result of which anormia arise. Norms break away from values and merge with particular institutional rules, forming an agreement on the methods of obtaining benefits – a negative value convention. The practical value of this scientific work lies in the possibility of using its materials in the process of developing decisions to reform the management decision-making system. (shrink)

Seriously engaging with the needs, hardships, and aspirations of future generations is an emotional experience as much as an intellectual endeavor. In this essay we describe a guided visualization exercise used to overcome the emotional barriers that often prevent us from dealing effectively with intergenerational decisions. The meditation and dreaming technique was applied to a diverse group of researchers who engaged in a visualized encounter with future generations. Following the exercise, we concluded that a serious analysis of intergenerational conflict requires (...) us to confront our own mortality. Also, somewhat surprisingly to workshop participants, our desire to become stewards of the planet was driven by our fear of death as well as our egoist yearning for immortality. We posit that imagining the unknown with visioning practices might increase our emotional resilience, and hence improve our ability to confront the burdens of intergenerational responsibility. (shrink)

This chapter provides an overview of the issues involved in recent debates about the epistemological relevance of emotions. We first survey some key issues in epistemology and the theory of emotions that inform various assessments of emotions’ potential significance in epistemology. We then distinguish five epistemic functions that have been claimed for emotions: motivational force, salience and relevance, access to facts and beliefs, non-propositional contributions to knowledge and understanding, and epistemic efficiency. We identify two core issues in the discussions about (...) such epistemic functions of emotions: First, even though it is plausible that emotions are involved in epistemic processes, it may be doubted whether they really matter for the normative question of what counts as knowledge or justified belief. Second, some of the epistemic functions claimed for emotions in general may only be attributed to some specifically epistemic emotions, which have been present all along in traditional epistemology, albeit under different labels such as ‘intuitions’. (shrink)