El reconocimiento de tendencias fenomenológicas en varias docenas de disciplinas fuera de la filosofía plantea la pregunta acerca del modo como puede de-finirse la fenomenología en general antes de la especificación según la disciplina particular. A continuación, tras un ensayo de respuesta a esta pregunta, se ofre-cerán algunas observaciones relativas a los posibles beneficios para la fenomeno-logía filosófica de los encuentros interdisciplinarios.Recognition of phenomenological tendencies in several dozen disciplines beyond philosophy raises the question of how phenomenology in general might be (...) defined prior to specification in terms of the agendas of the particular disciplines. After an attempt at an answer to this question, some observations concerning the possible benefits of interdisciplinary encounters, especially for philosophical philoso-phy, are offered. (shrink)

La cultura tiene muchas dimensiones, por ejemplo, la del género; pero, ¿qué pasa con la cultura de una nación tomándola como un todo? ¿Se puede uno aproximar fenomenológicamente a este tema? Usando una pequeña nación como ejemplo y utilizando una historia popular, yo debato aquí, en primer lugar, sobre cómo los objetos culturales concretos son diferentes de los objetos naturalistas una vez que estos se abstraen de todas las funciones o, mejor, usos que tienen. A continuación, describo Taiwan de modo (...) naturalista: geográficamente, geológicamente, ecológicamente, etc., y, después, antropológicamente, con respecto a cómo ha sido poblada. Dejando de lado la abstracción, lo siguiente es evocar aspectos culturales de esta isla para sus ciudadanos, en términos de religión, cultura alta, sistema social, economía y política. Estos aspectos ciertamente son diferentes para otras culturas nacionales, pero todas ellas tienen aspectos de este tipo y partiendo de este ejemplo uno podría ir más allá, a la cultura nacional en general. (shrink)

After addressing the question of whether Aron Gurwitsch (1901–1973) even had a theory of psychology, which is not obvious unless one collates the many dispersed remarks, a well-documented exposition of that theory is offered that clarifies the data, categories, field, methods, and topics of the versions of psychology he advocated.

Clarifying the essential experiential structures at work in our everyday moral engagements promises both (1) to provide a perspicacious self-understanding, and (2) to significantly contribute to theoretical and practical matters of moral philosophy. Since the phenomenological enterprise is concerned with revealing the a priori structures of experience in general, it is then well positioned to discern the essential structures of moral experience specifically. Phenomenology can therefore significantly contribute to matters pertaining to moral philosophy. In this paper I would like to (...) contribute to the relatively small yet burgeoning field of phenomenological ethics. I endea­vour to do so by first identifying and consolidating the basic level of sense-bestowal, and then outlining the a priori structures of volition in order to demonstrate how such phenomenologically discerned structures are required for moral experience. Specifically, in section one I locate moral experience as at the level of meaning that is phenomenologically identified as the life-world, and then vindicate the life-world by illustrating how it is immune to naturalistic rationalisation. By thus both securing the level of meaning that is of concern and importantly delimiting the scope of our analysis, I proceed in section two to relate the volitional analyses of Aristotle, Husserl, and Heidegger. This relation is achieved thanks to a conceptual point of con­tinuity: ‘prohairesis’. By examining the function of this concept (as an intentional structure) and its phenomenological continuity, the ground is then prepared for further phenomenological analyses of the virtues. (shrink)