It seems to be a platitude that the belief that p is correct iff it is true that p. And the claim that truth is the correct‐making feature of belief seems to be just another way of expressing this platitude. It is often thought that this indicates that truth constitutes a normative standard or criterion of correctness for belief because it seems to follow from this platitude that having a false belief is believing wrongly, and having a true belief is (...) believing rightly or correctly. In this paper, I aim to show that when we judge the platitude in question to be indisputably true, we do not endorse that truth is normative for belief but merely the triviality that the belief that p is true iff it is true that p. (shrink)

In this paper, I argue for a conditional parity thesis: if we are agents with respect to our intentions, we are agents with respect to our beliefs. In the final section, I motivate a categorical version of the parity thesis: we are agents with respect to belief and intention. My aim in this paper is to show that there is no unique challenge facing epistemic agency that is not also facing agency with respect to intention. My thesis is ambitious on (...) two fronts. First, the parity thesis is a substantive thesis about the nature of belief and intention. I argue that there is a structural parity of belief and intention; the status of whether they are agential stands and falls together. Second, the parity thesis illuminates the nature of agency. It constrains what counts as a satisfactory account of agency: either we must accept agency of both belief and intention, or we must reject both. In the final section, I argue that we have prima facie reason to accept agency of belief and intention. Finally, I diagnose why there has been such resistance to epistemic agency. Epistemic agency is problematic, but its problems are problems with agency, not problems with epistemic agency. (shrink)

Selon une thèse populaire en épistémologie contemporaine, une croyance est justifiée si, et seulement si, elle est une connaissance. Les défenseurs de cette thèse soutiennent également que la connaissance est la norme fondamentale de la croyance et que la conformité à cette norme est à la fois nécessaire et suffisante pour la justification. Je conteste l’affirmation selon laquelle la simple conformité à une norme suffit à justifier une croyance. La justification exige la conformité pour des raisons suffisantes et «invaincues». Une (...) conséquence de ceci est le rejet de la thèse selon laquelle la conformité à la norme de la croyance est nécessaire et suffisante pour la justification épistémique. (shrink)

Research in information systems includes a range of approaches which make varied contributions in terms of knowledge, understanding, or practical developments. In these days of “fake news” and spurious internet content, scholarly research needs to be able to demonstrate its validity – are its finding true, or its recommendations correct? We argue that there are fundamental validation criteria that can be applied to all research approaches despite their apparent diversity and conflict. These stem from current views of the nature of (...) truth, and the related but wider concept correctness, within philosophy. There has been much debate about the nature of truth – is it correspondence, coherence, consensual or pragmatic? Current debates revolve around the idea of a pluralist view of truth – that there are different forms of truth depending on the context or domain. Related to truth is the wider concept of correctness – propositions may be true but correctness can also be applied to actions, performances or behavior for which truth is not appropriate. We develop a framework for research validity and apply it to a range of research forms including positivist, interpretive, design science, critical and action-oriented. The benefits are: i) a greater and more explicit focus on validity criteria will produce better research; ii) having a single framework can provide some commonality between what at times seem conflicting approaches to research; iii) having criteria made explicit should encourage debate and further development. The framework is applied to a variety of empirical papers employing varied research approaches. (shrink)