The nexus of the moral luck debate is the control principle, which says that people are responsible only for things within their control. In this paper, I will first argue that the control principle should be restrained to blameworthiness, because responsibility is too wide a concept to square with control. Many deniers of moral luck appeal to the intuitiveness of the control principle. Defenders of moral luck do not share this intuition and demand a stronger defence of the control principle. (...) I will establish a defence of the control principle based on the value of simplicity for selecting a theory of blameworthiness. A simpler theory of blameworthiness is more likely to be true, and not being falsely judged blameworthy is desirable. I will conclude that simplicity advices the acceptance of the control principle over other theories of blameworthiness that embrace factors beyond control. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to improve our understanding of the category of moral “luck”. In current debate most often only specific cases of moral “luck” are taken into account. Such restrictions, however, involving a fragmentary picture of moral "luck", are introduced without any rationale for them. In this paper I look for a formal comprehensiveness of the category of moral “luck”. I consider three factors each of which is developed in two scenarios. These are (i) whether the agent’s (...) action is nasty or nice, (ii) whether the agent’s intention is confirmed or contradicted by her action, and (iii) whether the agent’s action is preceded by her intention or the lack thereof. I explore eight scenarios which are a mark of the intricacy of the category of moral “luck” otherwise ignored in the literature. After an assessment of their structure I arrive at new distinctions. The upshot is a rather complex set of correlations between several cases of moral “luck” with a variety of kinds and shades. (shrink)