This article is a reply to Marsha Enright's essay “The Problem with Selfishness.” Enright argues that “selfishness” is not the correct designation for living according to the Objectivist ethics. This article defends Rand's use of “selfishness,” on three grounds. First, the self is central to Rand's ethics, because a person must value his self before he can value anything or anyone. Second, immoral people are selfless, because organisms that function at the perceptual level of awareness do not have a self. (...) Third, Rand has identified the exact meaning of “selfishness,” whether or not her definition accords with dictionary definitions. (shrink)

The author argues that Rand’s ethical theory is much closer in essence to the eudaimonist, self-perfectionist perspectives of Aristotle and the neo-Aristotelians, Douglas Den Uyl and Douglas Rasmussen, than to the “selfish,” egoistic ethics many assume to be her basic position. He discusses Rand’s anti-hedonist and pro-rational selfishness positions as corollaries of man’s life as the standard of moral value, as well as Rand’s point that treating either happiness or personal benefit as the standard of moral value is a reversal (...) of cause and effect. He also identifies the oppressive negativism in Rand’s discussion of the seven canonical Objectivist virtues. (shrink)