Erasmus and Verhoef suggest that a promising response to the infinite God objection to the Kalām cosmological argument include showing that abstract objects do not exist; actually infinite knowledge is impossible; and redefining omniscience as : for any proposition p, if God consciously thinks about p, God will either accept p as true if and only if p is true, or accept p as false if and only if p is false. I argue that there is insufficient motivation for showing (...) and and that is problematic as a definition of omniscience. (shrink)

A common argument in support of a beginning of the universe used by advocates of the kalām cosmological argument (KCA) is the argument against the possibility of an actual infinite, or the “Infinity Argument”. However, it turns out that the Infinity Argument loses some of its force when compared with the achievements of set theory and it brings into question the view that God predetermined an endless future. We therefore defend a new formal argument, based on the nature of time (...) (just as geometrical reasoning is based on the nature of space), which addresses more directly the question of beginningless time. (shrink)

In a recent article, Andrew Ter Ern Loke raises several objections to Jacobus Erasmus and Anné Hendrik Verhoef’s exposition and response to the so-called ‘Infinite God Objection’ to the kalām cosmological argument. According to this objection, the argument against the possibility of an actual infinite brings into question the view that God’s knowledge is infinite. Erasmus and Verhoef’s solution to this objection, which Loke criticises, depends on an unusual account of omniscience. In this article, I respond to Loke and show (...) that his objections are unsuccessful. (shrink)

Recent scholarship has demonstrated Molina’s rejection of transworld damnation, claiming instead that there is at least one feasible world where any individual is freely saved, lost, or does not exist. This article argues that one can subscribe to Molina’s doctrine of individual predestination while maintaining, with William Lane Craig, that no actual person who fails to hear the gospel and is lost would have been saved in some feasible world where s/he heard the gospel. As part of the divine deliberation, (...) God could narrow down the spectrum of feasible worlds to a lower-order spectrum by factoring out worlds which, among other conditions, contain anyone who does not fall into either of two types. The first type comprises persons saved in at least one world where they receive only general revelation at the moment of salvation, lost in at least one world where they receive only general revelation, and lost in every world where they receive special revelation without first appropriating salvation through general revelation. The second type comprises persons saved in at least one world where they receive special revelation without first appropriating salvation through general revelation and lost in at least one comparable world. (shrink)