Surfaces have been much studied, but no consensus has been reached about the actual physical nature of the surface of a three-dimensional, mind-independent physical object. I analyze, from a common sense or “folk” perspective, the surface of a physically-extended simple in a space containing no other objects. From this, I propose the novel idea that a surface is not a part of an object or its outside but instead is made of two components: 1) the object as a unit whole, (...) or a unity, which acts as a barrier to 2) the outside space next to the object. I further propose that if there is no pre-existing outside space, the process of grouping zero or more things together into a new unit whole and physical object creates one with the grouping/unit-wholeness acting as a barrier to that newly created outside. A second test case containing 3 components and an observer is used to defend the hypothesis that a new outside space is created by the grouping process. When combined with a previously published example of an extended simple containing nothing inside, the two-part surface hypothesis suggests a process by which this simple can undergo self-replication leading to a Big Bang-like expansion of space. This offers a possible solution to an important question in philosophy: How do you start with one or a few fundamental existent entities and end up with the many contingent entities we see in the universe around us? (shrink)

Este artículo aborda un estudio metafísico sobre límites en la discusión sobre composición material. Según la tesis nihilista, dos o más objetos nunca componen otro objeto. Los objetos materiales ordinarios y sus límites (superficies) serían entidades fiat, mientras que los objetos simples (sin partes) y sus límites precisos son los únicos componentes bona fide del mundo. Sin embargo, si hay razones para postular la existencia de un límite bona fide que separa una colección de objetos de sus alrededores espaciales, entonces (...) tenemos razones para postular también la existencia de un objeto compuesto bona fide. Si existe un límite, dada su dependencia ontológica, debe existir un objeto al cual pertenece. La emergencia de un límite de un objeto material tridimensional instancia propiedades irreductibles a las propiedades de alguna de sus partes. No obstante, una vez que los límites son introducidos en el mundo, la presencia de vaguedad ontológica en términos modales resulta inevitable. (shrink)