Exclusionary defeat is Joseph Raz’s proposal for understanding the more complex, layered structure of practical reasoning. Exclusionary reasons are widely appealed to in legal theory and consistently arise in many other areas of philosophy. They have also been subject to a variety of challenges. I propose a new account of exclusionary reasons based on their justificatory role, rejecting Raz’s motivational account and especially contrasting exclusion with undercutting defeat. I explain the appeal and coherence of exclusionary reasons by appeal to commonsense (...) value pluralism and the intermediate space of public policies, social roles, and organizations. We often want our choices to have a certain character or instantiate a certain value and in order to do so, that choice can only be based on a restricted set of reasons. Exclusion explains how pro tanto practical reasons can be disqualified from counting towards a choice of a particular kind without being outweighed or undercut. (shrink)

As a legitimate authoritative directive is a second-order reason, it defeats conflicting reasons by a process of exclusion. Nonetheless, a legitimate authoritative directive can be defeated by more weighty reasons, including, as I argue in this paper, the more weighty reasons it excludes. This is part of a value pluralist conception of authority, according to which there is no general rule for the resolution of conflicting reasons. And I advance this argument in response to the work of Joseph Raz. Although (...) Raz is a value pluralist, he posits a general rule for the resolution of some conflicts: namely, that an exclusionary reason cannot be defeated by a (more weighty) reason it excludes. This represents a weak version of value pluralism. My argument is that Raz does not succeed in his efforts to show that this general rule either better ensures conformity with reason or that it is justified by commitment to autonomy. (shrink)

Résumé Le problème moral de l'autorité peut s'exprimer ainsi : comment l'autorité, avec la déférence qu'elle implique, peut-elle être compatible avec la liberté et la rationalité? L'approche pluraliste sépare l'obligation politique de l'autorité. Pour les pluralistes, l'autorité est à la fois injustifiable et inutile, et donc l'obligation politique légitime, y compris le devoir d'obéir à la loi, n'implique pas de déférence. Je soutiens qu'il est possible de conserver l'engagement pluraliste envers des motifs de légitimité pluriels, tout en réfutant les objections (...) pluralistes à l'autorité. En conséquence, chaque fois que l'autorité a une légitimité, la question morale de l'autorité exigera une réponse. (shrink)

According to preemptionism, a layperson should treat the fact that an epistemic authority believes p as a reason to believe p that replaces her other reasons relevant to believing p and is not simply added to them. Many authors have found the unqualified version of preemptionism, as defended by Linda Zagzebski, too strong. At the same time, a number of them have recently advocated weakened or qualified preemptionist accounts. In this paper, I criticise these accounts. I argue that some of (...) them cannot explain the possibility of rational persistent disagreements between laypeople and epistemic authorities, while those that can explain it fail to account either for the extent to which justification is a holistic phenomenon or for the role of what I call ‘control reasons’ in the laypeople's epistemic conduct. (shrink)

ABSTRACTAccording to the prioritized reason model of precedent, precedential constraint is explained in terms of the need for decision-makers to reconcile their decisions with a settled priority order extracted from past cases. The prioritized reason model of precedent departs from the view that common law rules comprise protected reasons for action. In this article I show that a model utilizing protected reasons and the prioritized reason model of precedential constraint are, in an important sense, equivalent. I then offer some reflections (...) on the philosophical significance of this result. I argue that the protected reason model is consistent with the phenomenology of precedential constraint. I suggest an account of precedential reasoning that reconciles the prioritized reason and protected reason models. (shrink)

Legal rationalist: law claims to give its subjects reasons for action. Normative reasons intuition: Reasons for action being key, the obvious way to establish that law makes a practical difference in people's deliberations is by arguing that the law claims to give reasons for action to its subjects. Explanatory Reasons Intuition: "And while it is possible to be confused about our normative reasons, it seems unlikely that everyone is confused all the time; so the fact that people consistently take the (...) law as their motivating reason and guide their conduct by the law does seem to suggest that the law does provide normative reasons for its subjects." And if it’s a necessary feature of law that it claims authority, then the argu- ment seems to establish that law claims to provide reasons for its subjects. Schematically the argument as a whole goes like this: The law claims to be a legitimate authority. If a legitimate authority directs a subject to φ the subject is obligated to φ ). The fact that an agent is obligated to φ is a reason for her to φ. So the law claims that its directives are reasons......Obligations as Reason-Giving : the fact that A is obligated to φ is itself a reason for A to φ. Unfortunately for the Legal Rationalist, OAR is false. Legal obligation has certain features which mean that the fact that a certain action’s being legally obligatory cannot itself constitute a reason to perform that action." Will explain away the intuitions in terms of triggering, and show how law can make a normative difference that is consistent with the falsity of OAR. Law's claim, and normative impact, can be captured exclusively in terms of second-order reasons. PartofwhatHartisafterhereistheideathatdeliberationon the matter of whether or not to φ is closed or settled by the obligation. But deliberation is cut off because the law has reached some sort of conclusion or answer or verdict on the question of whether or not to φ. The legal obligation not to φ contains a practical verdict about φing: it is not to be done. This idea – that the legal obligation not to φ provides or contains a verdict that φing is not to be done – is the idea that legal obligation is verdictive. For something to be verdictive is for it to express or embody a verdict or conclusion as to what ought to be done. It is plausible to say that wrongness is verdictive. So to say that such-and-such an action would be wrong is to express a verdict on that action – it is one which should not be done. To get a handle on the idea of the verdictive it helps to contrast it with the contributory. A contributory consideration is one which contributes to the verdict, by increasing the weight on the verdict’s side. So that φing would harm someone, or would cause extreme suffering, or would have costs that vastly outweighed any benefits, say, would be contributory considerations on the side of the verdict that φing would be wrong." "Wrong" is verdictive, and so it cannot itself be a reason for the action - it cannot be a reason for itself. Obligation and wrong in law are very close, and obligation should be treated as verdictive. This shows us that OAR is false. (shrink)

This paper contends that the requirement of content independence poses a pressing challenge to natural-duty theories of political obligation, for it is unclear why subjects of a state should not discharge the background natural duty in proper ways other than obeying the law. To demonstrate the force of this challenge, I examine and refute three argumentative strategies to achieve content independence represented in recent notable natural-duty theories: by appealing to the epistemic advantages of the state in discharging a natural duty, (...) by claiming that one’s denial of state authority necessarily poses an unjust threat to other people, and by invoking the consideration of fairness to preempt one’s discretion in discharging a natural duty. My criticisms, I believe, provide sufficient reasons for natural-duty theorists to take the requirement of content independence much more seriously. (shrink)

In a morally non-ideal legal system, how can law bind its subjects? How can the fact of a norm’s legality make it the case that practical reason is bound by that norm? Moreover, in such circumstances, what is the extent and character of law’s bindingness? I defend here an answer to these questions. I present a non-ideal theory of legality’s ability to produce binding reasons for action. It is not a descriptive account of law and its claims, it is a (...) normative theory of legal reasoning for particular social circumstances. The approach is, somewhat like Raz’s influential account, instrumental in character. Yet, it denies that the morally binding legal norms are, in whole or part, exclusionary reasons for the responsible subject. Law’s instrumentality must be given an alternative characterization. (shrink)

This thesis is about what a normative reason is and how reasons relate to oughts. I argue that normative reasons are to be understood as relational properties of favouring or disfavouring. I then examine the question: What is the relation between reasons, so understood, and what we ought to do, believe, or feel? I argue that the relation is an explanatory one. We should explain what we ought to do in terms of reasons, and not the other way around. This (...) view faces a number of difficulties, in particular in accounting for supererogatory acts and the distinction between an action being required and an action being recommended. The analysis that I provide explains how we can solve these problems. In providing such an analysis, this thesis aims to be a contribution to the discussion of how we might elucidate the structure of what is sometimes called normativity. (shrink)