Dans cet article, je soutiens que les métaphores « missile » et « ciblage » dans la recherche sur les médicaments à base de nanoparticules jouent différents rôles. Je soutiens que le « missile » joue un rôle scientifique marginal et un rôle plus central dans la communication, tandis que le « ciblage» est devenu une métaphore organisatrice dans le domaine de la recherche. La raison, je le suggère, est que le ciblage est l’explanandum principal du domaine et que cette (...) métaphore continue d’être pertinente même lorsque la nanomédecine mûrit pour s’attaquer à des problèmes plus complexes. Enfin, je discute des suggestions récentes de nouvelles métaphores axées sur la complexité, et je suggère que le rôle significatif des modèles simplificateurs et le besoin réel de tels modèles peuvent expliquer pourquoi les métaphores de complexité n’ont pas retenu l’attention des chercheurs. (shrink)

Dans cet article, je soutiens que les métaphores « missile » et « ciblage » dans la recherche sur les médicaments à base de nanoparticules jouent différents rôles. Je soutiens que le « missile » joue un rôle scientifique marginal et un rôle plus central dans la communication, tandis que le « ciblage» est devenu une métaphore organisatrice dans le domaine de la recherche. La raison, je le suggère, est que le ciblage est l’explanandum principal du domaine et que cette (...) métaphore continue d’être pertinente même lorsque la nanomédecine mûrit pour s’attaquer à des problèmes plus complexes. Enfin, je discute des suggestions récentes de nouvelles métaphores axées sur la complexité, et je suggère que le rôle significatif des modèles simplificateurs et le besoin réel de tels modèles peuvent expliquer pourquoi les métaphores de complexité n’ont pas retenu l’attention des chercheurs. (shrink)

Philosophical analyses of scientific concepts are legion. However, this literature is replete with methodological errors that have largely gone unnoticed. Five distinct projects are conflated which has led to faulty inferences, ambiguities, and mischaracterizations. There has also been some recent enthusiasm for approaches that attempt to rectify problematic scientific concepts but the motivations for these approaches are questionable. I am hopeful that by bringing these various issues to light that it will lead practitioners to be more explicit about their aims (...) and subsequently result in better analyses. (shrink)

Cultural evolution is normally framed in informational terms. However, it is not clear whether this is an adequate way to model cultural evolutionary phenomena and what, precisely, “information” is supposed to mean in this context. Would cultural evolutionary theory benefit from a well-developed theory of cultural information? The prevailing sentiment is that, in contradistinction to biology, informational language should be used nontechnically in this context for descriptive, but not explanatory, purposes. Against this view, this article makes the case for the (...) need to take a proper biology-based “informational turn” in the cultural evolutionary sciences. I argue that the current vague use of informational language misses out on the potential benefits for advancing understanding of phenomena that information-theoretic reasoning has provided in other sciences, especially genetics. In particular, by emphasizing the informational aspects of cultural evolutionary processes, this approach can clarify some conceptual and methodological problems that have plagued cultural evolutionary theory since its inception, including (1) how to determine the channel conditions of cultural information flow, (2) the nature and scope of cultural information, and (3) how to quantify trends of cultural cumulation. More generally, theories of cultural evolution will be incomplete until the mechanisms underlying cultural processes are better understood and integrated into the explanations. This article explores the adequacy of an information-theoretic framework to accomplish these purposes. (shrink)

Diagrams can serve as representational models in scientific research, yet important questions remain about how they do so. I address some of these questions with a historical case study, in which diagrams were modified extensively in order to elaborate an early hypothesis of protein synthesis. The diagrams’ modelling role relied mainly on two features: diagrams were modified according to syntactic rules, which temporarily replaced physico-chemical reasoning, and diagram-to-target inferences were based on semantic interpretations. I then explore the lessons for the (...) relative roles of syntax, semantics, external marks, and mental images, for justifying diagram-to-target inferences, and for the “artefactual approach” to scientific models. (shrink)