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  1. Regulating Social Media as a Public Good: Limiting Epistemic Segregation.Toby Handfield - 2023 - Social Epistemology (6):1-16.
    ABSTRACT The rise of social media has correlated with an increase in political polarization, which many perceive as a threat to public discourse and democratic governance. This paper presents a framework, drawing on social epistemology and the economic theory of public goods, to explain how social media can contribute to polarization, making us collectively poorer, even while it provides a preferable media experience for individual consumers. Collective knowledge and consensus is best served by having richly connected networks that are epistemically (...)
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  • (2 other versions)Democracy.Tom Christiano - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
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  • The Deliberative Model of Democracy: Two Critical Remarks.Raf Geenens - 2007 - Ratio Juris 20 (3):355-377.
    The deliberative model of democracy, as presented by Jürgen Habermas and others, claims to reconstruct the normative content of the idea of democracy. However, since it overemphasises the epistemic facet of decision‐making, the model is unable to take into account other valuable aspects of democracy. This is shown in reference to two concrete phenomena from political reality: majority voting and the problem of the dissenter. In each case, the deliberative model inevitably fails to account for several normatively desirable features of (...)
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  • Problems some deliberative democrats have with authority.Allyn Fives - forthcoming - Philosophy and Social Criticism.
    An authoritative directive, when it has legitimacy, is a reason to exclude from consideration some of the reasons to act and not to act in this way. One is obliged to obey, even when one disagrees with the directive. Therefore, authority demands deference regarding how one acts, although one is free to think what one likes about that action. How can deference of this kind be compatible with freedom and rationality? That is the so-called moral problem of authority. For some, (...)
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