The Brahmaj?la Sutta includes a list of ‘views’ that are wrong in some sense. The present paper turns the focus away from the content of the views to ask in what sense they are problematic, by what criteria they are here found to be so, and, indeed, just what kinds of things the views are. The frameword in which the views are set suggests that what the Buddha finds problematic is not the content so much as the epistemological standpoint, or, (...) more properly, the mode-of-being of which the views are a part: it is the sama?a-br?ma?as who proclaim the views rather than the views per se that are wrong. (shrink)

The Qur’an frequently abhors blind faith based on tradition in its arguments against non-believers. Nonetheless, the Qur’an repeatedly asks people to believe in its message. How does the Qur’an distinguish between both kinds of faith? This article investigates the type of epistemology the Qur’an expects from its audience. Linguistically, the Qur’anic concept of īmān may be compared to taking refuge in Buddhism, in that it is through experience and insight (prajñā), as portrayed in the Kālāma Sutta, and not zeal. The (...) Qur’an differentiates between two types of conviction, that which is received through discernment and understanding, and that which is blind. The Qur’an shows cues of an attempt to harmonise faith and reason. It does not entertain non-believers in their request to have supernatural physical proofs, but frequently reminds them to use their reason and observation. This opens further avenues of interfaith dialogue between Buddhism and Islam. (shrink)