In ‘The logic of partial supposition’ (Analysis vol. 81), Benjamin Eva and Stephan Hartmann investigate partial imaging, a credence-revision method which combines the partiality familiar from Jeffrey Conditioning(The Logic of Decision, 1983) with the formal notion of imaging familiar from Lewis’s ‘Causal decision theory’ (1981). They argue that because partial imaging is non-monotonic, it ‘fail[s] to provide a plausible account of the norms of partial subjunctive suppositions’.In this note, I present a notion of partial imaging that does satisfy monotonicity, and (...) discuss some of the applications and ramifications. The account frames conditioning as a form of imaging, and rejects Gärdenfors’s principle of linearity in ‘Imaging and conditionalization’ (1982). (shrink)

This article strengthens a dilemma posed by Eva and Hartmann (2021). They show that accounts of partial subjunctive supposition based on imaging sometimes violate a natural monotonicity condition. The paper develops a more general framework for modelling partial supposition and shows that, in this framework, imaging-based accounts of partial subjunctive supposition always violate monotonicity. In fact, the only account of partial supposition that satisfies monotonicity is the one that Eva and Hartmann defend for indicative suppositions. Insofar as one is committed (...) to monotonicity, then, one cannot distinguish the indicative and subjunctive moods for partial supposition. One might avoid this result by rejecting the general framework that it relies upon, but that itself would be a surprising and interesting outcome. (shrink)