Dual-aspect monism and neutral monism offer interesting alternatives to mainstream positions concerning the mind-matter problem. Both assume a domain underlying the mind-matter distinction, but they also differ in definitive ways. In the twentieth century, variants of both positions have been advanced by a number of protagonists. One of these variants, the dual-aspect monism due toWolfgang Pauli and Carl Gustav Jung, will be described and commented on in detail. As a unique feature in the Pauli-Jung conception, the duality of mental and (...) material aspects is specified in terms of a complementarity. This sounds innocent, but entails a number of peculiarities distinguishing their conjecture from other approaches. (shrink)

Within a state-space approach endowed with a generalized potential function, mental states can be systematically characterized by their stability against perturbations. This approach yields three major classes of states: (1) asymptotically stable categorial states, (2) marginally stable non-categorial states and (3) unstable acategorial states. The particularly interesting case of states giving rise to exceptional experiences will be elucidated in detail. Their proper classification will be related to Metzinger’s account of self-model and world-model, and empirical support for this classification will be (...) surveyed. Eventually, it will be outlined how Metzinger’s discussion of intentionality achieves pronounced significance within a dual-aspect framework of thinking. (shrink)

The term complementarity plays a central role in quantum physics, not least in various approaches to defining entanglement and the conditions for its occurrence. It has, however, been used in a variety of ways by different authors, denoting different concepts and relationships. Here we describe and clarify some of them and analyze the role they play with respect to the phenomenon of entanglement. Based on these considerations we discuss the recently proposed system-theoretical generalization of the concepts entanglement and complementarity (Atmanspacher (...) et al. in Found Phys 32(3):379–406, 2002; von Lucadou et al. in J Conscious Stud 14(4):50–74, 2007; Filk and Römer in Axiomathes 21(2):211–220, 2011; Walach and Von Stillfried in Axiomathes 21(2): 185–209, 2011). We hope that a clarification regarding the specific meaning of these terms can be useful to the growing engagement with this interesting hypothesis and its critical investigation. (shrink)