Theories of intergenerational obligations usually take the shape of theories of distributive (social) justice. The complexities involved in intergenerational obligations force theorists to simplify. In this article I unpack two popular simplifications: the inevitability of future generations, and the Hardinesque assumption that future individuals are a burden on society but a benefit to parents. The first assumption obscures the fact that future generations consist of individuals whose existence can be a matter of voluntary choice, implying that there are individuals who (...) are responsible and accountable for that choice and for its consequences. The second assumption ignores the fact that the benefits and burdens of future individuals are complex, and different for different “beneficiaries” or “victims.” Introducing individual responsibility for procreation as a (crucially) relevant variable, and allowing a more sophisticated understanding of the impact of new individuals, generates grounds to prioritize the individual’s interest in responsibility for (creating and equipping) future individuals over any collective intergenerational obligation. I illustrate this by introducing a series of moral duties that take precedence over, and perhaps even void, possible collective redistributive duties. (shrink)

New life sciences innovation offers the possibility of new conceptions of human nature with significant impact on liberal theories of justice. So far, nature as such has been thought to be something given and beyond human control. Thus, to define something as natural has meant the same thing as to relegate it to the realm of fortune or misfortune, rather than justice or injustice. However, the successful decoding of the human genome and subsequent advances in genomics-based technologies begins to change (...) this conception to a new one: nature can be something dynamic and within human control. Therefore, genomics-based technologies can make possible the just distribution of natural goods (rationality, intelligence, etc). Can liberal political theories successfully deal with this new possibility of justice? This paper addresses the question by briefly assessing Rawls' egalitarianism, Nozick's libertarianism and Sen's capability theory of justice. It is argued that these theories fail to address the new possibility of justice made feasible by life sciences innovation. On the one hand, libertarianism is insensitive to natural inequalities. On the other hand, egalitarianism and the capability theory of justice are limited to compensating for natural inequalities and avoid ensuring just distribution of natural goods. Contemporary liberal theories are not dynamic enough to deal with distributive justice in the 21st century. (shrink)

Germ-line genetic engineering procedures may influence the lives of untold millions of people far into the future. These techniques change the genetic material that is passed on to offspring and thus have the potential to change the human race as we know it. Because the effects are so enduring, this powerful technique must be used with caution. We must decide how to ethically evaluate potential changes to the germ-line consistently and effectively so that future generations are not harmed. I will (...) show that a concept of traits that any rational person would find desirable in themselves and others (whatever the situation), known as primary goods, is necessary to justify germ-line genetic enhance-ments. Without primary goods, a genetic engineer is in no position to determine which traits should or should not be passed on to future generations. One must then create a list of universally acceptable primary goods and convincing evidence that germ-line genetic pro-cedures will augment them. I will show that the strongest conception of primary goods not only fails to support germ-line enhancements, but provides a compelling argument against it. Primary goods are difficult to enumerate given the variety of unexpected situations a person may encounter in life. However, those making decisions as to which characteristics are transmitted to progeny would have to comparatively evaluate the desirability of different traits. These decisions must be made based on primary goods. Rawls’ list of natural primary goods includes health, intelligence, and self-respect. While listing primary goods is controversial, those who have tried have always mentioned self-respect, which, as I will explain, is prerequisite to enjoying any other goods in life and is the most important primary good for Rawls. I argue that germ-line enhancements, far from promoting primary goods, will threaten them. I begin by making three assumptions about issues central to the discussion of germ-line enhancements. 1) I assume that germ-line genetic engineering will be capable of enhancing human traits. 2) I assume that the definitions of traits such as intelligence can be taken at face value. 3) I finally assume that germ-line enhancements will be distributed justly without prompting a treatment of distributive justice. For the purposes of this discussion I will assume an optimistic view of the potential of genetic engineering to enhance human traits. Only time will tell what is possible through genetic engineering, but at present it is useful to discuss the subject as if it will be nearly omnipotent, since that is the circumstance that grants the most com-pelling arguments in favor of germ-line enhancement. (shrink)