Haack classifies Spengler’s views on the end of science as what she terms annihilationist in that he forecasts the absolute termination of scientific activity as opposed to its completion or culmination. She also argues that in addition to his externalist argument that Western science, as cultural product, cannot survive the demise of Western Culture, Spengler also puts forward an internalist argument that science, regardless of the imminent demise of Western Culture, is in terminal decline as evidenced by its diminishing returns. (...) I argue against Haack that Spengler’s argument for the diminishing returns of modern science is in fact an externalist one, in that he locates the sources of science’s current decline outside the discipline of science itself, attributing them to a change in cultural attitude towards scientific endeavours. I further argue that Spengler’s prediction of the imminent end of science was directed specifically at pure science, and that he in fact held that applied science would continue to develop. I also take issue with Haack’s suggestion that Spengler’s views on science were outmoded at the time that he wrote them. (shrink)

This paper argues that the recent renewal of interest in the philosophy of Oswald Spengler, particularly concerning its warnings of the imminent demise of Western Civilisation, is misplaced. Arguments concerning the accuracy of his predictions or cultural analysis have overlooked the necessity of evaluating the coherence of the philosophical system that Spengler used to generate and justify his speculative declarations. Such an evaluation indicates a number of apparent contradictions at the heart of Spengler’s historical model. The attempt to resolve these (...) contradictions has resulted in a sharp division of interpretation amongst Spengler commentators, into positivist and relativist camps. Neither interpretation, I suggest, is capable of rendering Spengler’s historical system coherent. It is therefore argued that Spengler’s philosophy is fundamentally flawed. (shrink)

Este artículo ofrece una visión paralela sobre el problema de la técnica de Oswald Spengler y de Henri Bergson, autores de El hombre y la técnica. Una contribución a la filosofía de la vida y Las dos fuentes de la moral y de la religión, respectivamente. En general, el trabajo se centra en estos dos ensayos para dar cuenta de los puntos en común y de la distancia entre estos dos pensadores. El texto está dividido en tres apartados. Uno muestra (...) sus respectivas visiones antropológicas en relación con el problema de la técnica, a continuación, comenta afinidades y desencuentros en relación a su interpretación histórica de la cuestión del maquinismo, y, en tercer lugar, se habla de la cuestión más relativa al contexto histórico de estas dos contribuciones al tema que aquí nos ocupa. ¿En qué medida es para ambos la técnica un signo de decadencia o no? En este último punto, la perspectiva fatalista de Spengler se separa de la bergsoniana. (shrink)