In this article, we consider Derrida’s grasp on counter-institution and outline a peculiar modality of ethics that it engenders. After evoking his counter-institutional public engagements in the introduction, we begin an analysis of the word counter-institution. In the first place, the polysemy of its prefix “counter” is exposed, followed by the claim that in Derrida’s philosophy this term denotes proximity and contact, rather than opposition – thus determining the architecture of the counter-institution. Furthermore, we discuss Derrida’s critique of traditional, sovereign (...) institutions that he saw as unjust and violent, relating it to his theory of decision, and making the claim that counter-institutions are inseparable from justice. In the second part, we conceptualize what is named the counter-ethics of promise and responsibility. By juxtaposing Derrida’s unorthodox views on the notions of promise and responsibility, we seek to formulate a counter-ethical thought that animates the relations in and of the counter-institution and challenges the limits of ethics. Finally, we propose that Derrida’s idea of unfaithful fidelity could be understood as the very condition counter-ethics, and by consequence, of deconstruction. (shrink)